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R E D E N

REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE
ESTUDIOS NORTEAMERICANOS

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Articles

University and the Humanities: Current Challenges

Fernando Galván

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Galván

University and the Humanities: Current Challenges[1]

The institution of the University has been going through a process of intense change and evolution in its mission and objectives in these first decades of the twenty-first century, and even during the final decades of the twentieth century. Six years ago, in Australia, the firm Ernst & Young published a report titled *University of the Future: A Thousand Year Old Industry on the Cusp of Profound Change.* The authors of this report identified three types of universities: 1) those maintaining the status quo, though updating their mission ("streamlined status quo"); 2) those filling a specific niche in the market ("niche dominators"); and 3) those which are transforming the university ("transformers").

The first group, those termed "streamlined status quo," are the established universities, some of which boast hundreds of years of history. These preserve their pedagogical and research traditions, though they are gradually transforming and updating the service and administration models of their institution. This evolution naturally implies changes in the manner in which these universities interact with students, governments, key players in industry, secondary schools, and the community.

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[1] This text, translated from Spanish, was the inaugural lecture of the academic year 2018-19, delivered at the University of Alcalá on September 10, 2018. Even though a few stylistic changes have been made, and a brief list of works cited was added, I have preferred to keep its original oral style.

The second group, the "niche dominators," includes both established universities as well as new institutions. As their name suggests, the purpose of these institutions is fundamentally to reshape and refine their "portfolio of services" and the markets in which they operate. They focus their attention on specific "client groups" by offering a customized education and operating similarly with research and research-related services. This customization, in turn, leads these institutions to modify their business, organizational, and operational models. The terms "portfolio of services," "market," "client group," and "business model" are significant.

The third group of universities is that of the "transformers," comprised of new, private institutions who are creating a position for themselves in the, shall we say, "traditional" sector and creating new market avenues. They are thus fusing aspects of the higher education sector with other sectors, such as the media, technology, innovation, and venture capital, among others. This

The emergence of new institutions, especially of this last group, the "transformers," is changing the relationship between universities and society, both in the public and private spheres

leads to the creation of new markets, new areas, and new sources of economic value, which in turn increases the benefit derived from investing in the central business: namely teaching and research that are internationally competitive.

I believe that all of us here today are aware that this, to phrase it simply and in few words, is the current situation in which universities around the world find themselves. The emergence of new institutions, especially of this last group, the "transformers," is changing the relationship between universities and society, both in the public and private spheres. This is what ultimately produces the changes that established universities, those that are historic and traditional, and even those with less than half a century of existence, are currently experiencing. The appearance in this same period of numerous university rankings and the importance they are given by the media, governments, and employers, is one more example of the wave of innovation which is affecting universities around the world and which is used to justify the launch of new educational businesses, each more closely linked to specific business sectors and industries.

In addition to this phenomenon, we also observe the growing importance in the educational agenda of curricular innovations, including life-long learning and the new digital technologies, in higher education as well as at other educational levels. Both life-long learning and the inclusion of digital technologies are clearly a response to the new challenges posed by the constantly changing conditions of the job market. National governments and supra-national

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entities, such as the European Commission, foster this innovation and support it, as reflected in their calls for projects. On May 30, 2017, the Renewed EU Agenda for Higher Education, as a follow-up to the 2011 Modernisation Agenda, was presented. It falls within this framework, supporting the changes I have just described and facilitating a more direct relationship between universities and industry. One such example is the promotion of industrial doctorates within a new model for Doctoral Programs. These are modifications which, to my understanding, strengthen universities and contribute to their efficacy in providing the service they are expected to provide to society. Thus, in my opinion, these changes should be welcomed.

Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the negative reactions to this innovating trend that are beginning to manifest within the university. The European University Association (EUA) published a statement in July 2017 titled "EUA's Response to the Renewed EU Agenda for Higher Education," in which the EUA essentially welcomed these innovations, while also warning against the inherent risks involved in adopting some of them. Among the topics discussed, for example, the EUA was reticent as regards the transformation of STEM to STEAM, by the simple addition of A (for "Arts") into the quartet of subjects considered to be fundamental in education (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math). To quote, "EUA is also convinced that STEAM…is not an adequate concept to include the unique contributions of arts, humanities, and social sciences. EUA would prefer to see greater recognition of the value of a diverse disciplinary and interdisciplinary landscape, including small and rare disciplines" (p. 2). In another section discussing research, the EUA also expressed its reservations as to the EU's market orientation in its innovations: "Translating research outcomes into marketable innovations is only one of the outcomes of research activity; the contribution of university research to innovation goes well beyond this, as it generates societal well-being of an economic, social, educational and cultural nature, with long-term benefits for social welfare" (p. 3).

This declaration by the EUA cannot go without notice as it reflects the common position held by the hundreds of European universities that this association represents. The underlying purpose of the EUA is for European universities to acquire a dimension that will differentiate them from universities in other regions of the world, in particular North America and Asia. If we consider the positions universities from these regions hold in international rankings, generally better than the vast majority of European universities, it becomes easy to understand the reticence displayed by some of the world's oldest universities to assimilate to or directly replicate the North American and Asian models.

I could provide myriad examples of others who share this same perspective, though in the interest of time I will not do so in depth. Allow me, however, to at least mention five books on this topic from the past twenty years. The first two are *Cultivating Humanity. A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (1997) and *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (2010) by the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum. The next ones are *La utilidad de lo inútil: Manifiesto* (2013) by the Italian professor and philosopher Nuccio Ordine; and *Adiós a la Universidad: El eclipse de las Humanidades* (2011), and *La luz de los faros. Una defensa apasionada de las Humanidades* (2017), authored by the Spaniards Jordi Llovet and Carlos García Gual respectively.

Nowadays we live in a technological society, or a "technologized" one, if you prefer. Science and Technology dominate our society more than ever before, and they have provided us with a level of well-being and comfort so far unknown in history. Science is the source of knowledge, and knowledge today is more accessible than ever thanks to technological innovations. However, while this is true and is a great advantage with respect to our past, it is equally true that obscurantism and the manipulation of the truth has seized our present. We are all too familiar with the phenomenon of "fake news" and the concept of "post-truth" and the inherent risks these pose to understanding and democracy. The institution of the University should do something to combat this plague that has caused catastrophes in western democracies, catastrophes about which more evidence is revealed every day.

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Yet in addition to the ease with which "fake news" is disseminated through the social and news media, leading to the manipulation of citizens' wishes, we have also observed, for years, the advance of machines, which at times seem to threaten to replace humankind. With robots, cyborgs, androids, and other similar technological manifestations, some are already using the term "post-human" to define our current technological civilization. And I am not referring to science fiction, I am referring to a reality that draws closer every day.

The role that robots play in our society, for example, led the European Parliament to approve an initiative last year urging the European Commission to develop a proposal for a directive on robots and artificial intelligence. The impact that robots are having on our economy, scientific research, security, data protection, and, of course, on people is evident. There are questions that should be at the center of university debate: questions such as the ethical, legal, economic, social, and pedagogic consequences of robots and artificial intelligence systems in the production of goods and services, including preventative medical care. How should we regulate, for example, driverless cars or the employment of androids to care for the elderly, complete household tasks, or

provide company? Do these androids have labor rights? How can we face up to the likely loss of human employment due to the progressive automation of myriad productive processes? Should these non-human entities (or their owners) pay taxes and contribute to social security in order to contribute to social benefits policies such as unemployment and pensions?

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Furthermore, we must define deontological questions within research and in the development of this sector. Think of the impact that bioengineering or genetic engineering might have on our lives, which they already do, in fact. Consider for a moment the ethical limitations of the "technologicalization," if you will, of health and medical research… There are two novels from this century that I would like to mention in this respect, as they allow us to question, from a human perspective, these post-human phenomena. The first, published in 2005, is titled *Never Let Me Go*, by Kazuo Ishiguro, the Japan-born British writer who was honored with the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2017. The other, published in 2015, *The Heart Goes Last*, is a work published by the Canadian author Margaret Atwood, well-known for her *The Handmaid's Tale*, published in 1985, which has recently been adapted into a television series.

Ishiguro's novel examines the ethical dilemma of a group of human beings created by genetic engineering to serve as entities with therapeutic ends. This is to say they were created to serve as organ donors for transplants. These beings, which are completely human, have feelings and perceptions that do not appear to be compatible with the destiny that they face. The reader must eventually ask him or herself how far bioengineering may be allowed to go. Is it ethical for these people to exist only to serve an ancillary purpose?

Analogously, in the more recent novel by Margaret Atwood, the protagonist couple faces existence in a society dominated by a group that controls – or pretends to control – creation and reproduction, and even human feelings. There are clones, there are injections to erase memories, to make lives disposable, etc. As in Ishiguro's novel, *The Heart Goes Last* by Margaret Atwood presents us with the challenge of living in peace and prosperity, of having access to a world which is more

The reader must eventually ask him or herself how far bioengineering may be allowed to go. Is it ethical for these people to exist only to serve an ancillary purpose?

I believe that the response to these challenges can be found in the Humanities, the Social Sciences, Political Theory, Mathematics, and Physics; those subjects which Aristotle believed should ultimately comprise the education of human beings

comfortable, supposedly happy, and technologically advanced. Yet, in the end, the deep-seated issues that subsist in our societies arise in the novel, from global and globalized terror, to the catastrophe that is climate change, to the multiple effects of the technological era.

Above all else, however, it is necessary for the University to consider what it can do. Which disciplines could contribute to the creation of a just post-human policy – a policy that responds appropriately to these challenges and that includes a global, multi-species perspective. It seems clear that the models of universities that I mentioned at the beginning (the "streamlined status quo," the "niche dominators," and the "transformers") are not the answer due to their focus on markets, on industry and innovation, on the attainment of economic benefit, etcetera.

I believe that the response to these challenges can be found in the Humanities, the Social Sciences, Political Theory, Mathematics, and Physics; those subjects which Aristotle believed should ultimately comprise the education of human beings. Humanism, in this sense, is to view the world from the perspective of humankind, or "man" (ἄνθρωπος, in the Greek sense of the word; let us remember Protagoras' famous *dictum*, πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, "man is the measure of all things"). That is to say, these humanistic disciplines are those that can lead to scientific understanding and technical solutions, and do not pursue an economic or merely technological goal, which is why they may sometimes be called "useless" or "non-utilitarian."

Let us agree that these disciplines, these Humanities in the classical and wider sense of the word (which must include, as I said, the Mathematical Sciences and Physics), are those which allow us to exercise our criticism of cultures and techno-scientific hegemonies, as well as address the sustainability and post-humanization problems of technological society. This is due to the fact that History, for example, has given us access to knowledge of the past, and with it humankind can develop a sense of roots, evolution, and foresight. Philosophy and Letters provide us with control of language and logic and with the accompanying ability to develop opinions and express them cogently, so as to be able to communicate with others. Of Mathematics, Physics, and Biology Abraham Flexner already wrote almost eighty years ago, in 1939, in an article titled "The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge" (*Harper's Magazine*, October 1939, pp. 544-552), which contains a passionate defense of knowledge for knowledge's sake, beyond any application or practical benefit, and which has been incorporated as an appendix to Nuccio Ordine's previously-cited book, *La utilidad de lo inútil: Manifiesto* (2013).

Martha Nussbaum, the American philosopher I mentioned earlier, winner of the 2012 Prince of Asturias Award in Social Sciences, has been writing about these issues, especially as relates to democracy. Nussbaum has worked closely with Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, on topics that involve development and ethics, in her case from what is generally described as an "Aristotelian" perspective, as Martha Nussbaum places particular emphasis on humans' social and political nature (the Greek "ζῷον πολῑ́τῐκόν"). If I mention this now, it is to return to the argument I presented earlier about the risk to democracy and our civilization if we set aside the Humanities. How can we fight and defeat "fake news," populism, the manipulation of the truth, or the rampant insensibility of a society that is increasingly unsupportive and paralyzed in the face of humanity's grave problems?

From the beginning, this philosopher has sent a clear message against the economicism and utilitarianism of our society and our science. She writes, "Thirsty for national profit, nations, and their systems of education, are heedlessly discarding skills that are needed to keep democracies alive. If this trend continues, nations all over the world will soon be producing generations of useful machines, rather than complete citizens who can think for themselves, criticize tradition, and understand the significance of another person's sufferings and achievements. The future of the world's democracies hangs in the balance" (p. 16).

Yet it is clear that an education exclusively dedicated to the training of technical teams, to economic and technological growth, is insufficient

As you can see, Nussbaum points to the ability to think critically and comprehend others' achievements and suffering. This should be valued in our citizenry as the characteristics that make us truly humans and humanists. We cannot be unfeeling to the constant suffering we see repeated day after day in our news broadcasts, that of so many human beings who go hungry, who are persecuted for their ideas or ideological positions, or who simply are murdered in wars and other conflicts...If we do not cultivate that sensitivity and are incapable of putting ourselves in someone else' shoes, to feel vicariously, we fail as a democratic citizenry but we also fail as human beings.

This goal is achieved through education, as was already stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Yet it is clear that an education exclusively dedicated to the training of technical teams, to economic and technological growth, is insufficient, even though it will produce competent professionals for social, economic, and productive development. And so it will be if the objective is to provide citizens with a combination of abilities essential to combatting the ills to which I referred before, such as obscurantism, post-truth, fake news, and an ethical insensibility in the face of the great moral dilemmas raised by bioengineering, genetic engineering, etc.

To achieve this type of citizenry, we must cultivate the critical ability to evaluate historic processes, economic development, social justice, and the complexities of the principal world religions. It is not enough to know these things, like the knowledge in an encyclopedia or a simple accumulation of facts; rather one must be able to comprehend them, to distinguish between trustworthy evidence and that which is not, to distinguish between truth and falsehoods. This is achieved by philosophical training and through critical education, in the humanities, in the traditional vein of American liberal arts colleges.

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We must fight against post-humanism, post-truth, and the manipulation of science and technology, erroneously oriented toward economic benefit and a false expectation of social well-being.

This is the fundamental mission of the university. Indeed, as Drew Faust, former president of Harvard University, stated a few years ago: "Higher learning can offer individuals and societies a depth and breadth of vision absent from the inevitably myopic present. Human beings need meaning, understanding, and perspective as well as jobs. The question should not be whether we can afford to believe in such purposes in these times, but whether we can afford not to" (Instituto).

But teaching our students – both within the University and elsewhere – to think, to question, to exercise critical analysis, is neither easy nor cheap. It is not as easy as adding a simple "A" (for "Arts") to the concept of STEM, as I discussed before in reference to the EUA's critique of the renewed Agenda of the European Union. No, educating within the school of Socratic thought, which is fundamental to advancing in the comprehension of reality, requires a constant dialogue between the professor and his or her students. It also requires a low student/professor ratio, which allows the professor to read weekly the essays written by the students and to return them, annotated and corrected, in order to draw out of them the ability to think critically and question. A professor in a class of one or two hundred students delivering a lecture on Aristotelian ethics, or on the modernist novel, or on Baroque painting, does not accomplish much. That leads, as we know, to the accumulation of encyclopedic knowledge, not to a true education within the humanities.

In the final conclusion of her book *Not for Profit*, Nussbaum summarizes with these lines the challenge that are facing our democratic societies and our universities: "If we do not insist on the crucial importance of the humanities and the arts, they will drop away, because they do not make money. They only do what is much more precious than that, make a world that is worth living in, people who are able to see other human beings as full people, with thoughts and feelings of their own that deserve respect and empathy, and nations that are able to overcome fear and suspicion in favor of sympathetic and reasoned debate" (p. 117).

Mario Vargas Llosa also said as much in his acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2010: "A world without literature would be a world without desires or ideals or irreverence, a world of automatons deprived of what makes the human being really human: the capacity to move out of oneself and into another, into others, modeled with the clay of our dreams" (p. 12). This is the current great challenge for higher education, for research, and for science. We

must fight against post-humanism, post-truth, and the manipulation of science and technology, erroneously oriented toward economic benefit and a false expectation of social well-being.

It has now been almost a century since Ortega y Gasset stated with great forcefulness in his well-known essay *Mission of the University (Misión de la Universidad)*: "Let us not be the dupes of science. For if science is the grandest creation of man, it is made possible, after all, by human life." ("No seamos paletos de la ciencia. La ciencia es el mayor portento humano; pero por encima de ella está la vida humana misma, que la hace posible".) Let us not forget either what Pedro Salinas, one of the greatest poets of the past century, said in his passionate defense of reading, of criticism, and of language in his book *El defensor.* Salinas examined the humanist challenge in terms of the historical obligation towards the cultural legacy inherited from our parents, which we must transmit to our children. And so this is the greatest challenge which we face at this moment within the University: the preservation and sharing of our cultural heritage and inherited values, while also promoting the creation of new areas of knowledge, of art, of scientific discovery; in short, of all that which makes us truly advance as human beings.

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Indestructible Pasts and Paranoid Presents: Jonathan Frazer against Active Forgetting in *Purity*

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Indestructible Pasts and Paranoid Presents: Jonathan Frazer against Active Forgetting in *Purity*

ABSTRACT

Remembering and forgetting are linked as inevitably as life and death. Sometimes, forgetting is motivated by a biological disorder or brain damage, or it may be the product of an unconscious desire deriving from a traumatic event (psychological repression). But in some cases, forgetting can be consciously motivated (thought suppression). It is through the conscious repression of memories that we can find self-preservation and move forward, although this may mean, as Nietzsche suggests in his essay "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life" (1997), that we create a fable of our lives. In Jonathan Franzen's novel *Purity* (2015), forgetting is an active and conscious process; the characters choose to forget certain episodes of their lives so as to be able to construct new identities. Their erased memories include murder, economic privileges following from illegal or unethical commercial procedures, and dark sexual episodes. Their obsession with forgetting the past links the lives of the main characters, and it structures the narrative of the novel. The motivated erasure of memories thus becomes a means by which the characters are able to to survive and confront their present according to a (fake) narrative that they have constructed. But is motivated forgetting possible? Can one completely suppress facts in an active way? This paper analyses the role of forgetting in Franzen's novel in relation to the need in our contemporary society to deny, hide, or erase uncomfortable data from our historical or personal archives; the need to make disappear stories which we do not want to accept, recognize, and much less make known to the public. This is related to how we manage information in the age of technology, to the "selection" of what is to be the official story, and to how we rewrite our own history.

In his family memoir, *Nothing to Be Frightened of* (2008), Julian Barnes states that "We talk about our memories, but should perhaps talk more about our forgettings, even if that is a more difficult - or logically impossible - feat" (p. 38). With this statement, Barnes points up the aporetic condition of talking about events that we no longer remember: how can we discuss something that has been erased, something that no longer exists? To do so is, as the author proclaims, logically impossible. Indeed, we cannot talk about what we do not know. But can we, as human beings, completely erase memories in a conscious way? Is there any way that we can then recover those lost memories? Are they hidden away, or simply destroyed? As we know, forgetting is sometimes motivated by neurological damage, or is the product of an unconscious desire (psychological

"We talk about our memories, but should perhaps talk more about our forgettings, even if that is a more difficult - or logically impossible - feat"

repression). In other cases, forgetting can be consciously motivated (thought suppression). For some authors (among them, Nietszche, 1997), the conscious repression of negative memories enables self-preservation. Jonathan Franzen's novel *Purity*, however, questions this premise. For Franzen, active oblivion (thought suppression) is impossible and undesirable, and what remains, therefore, is the acknowledgment that forgetting is a human activity, while at the same time he considers it to be the force that destroys the very essence of what constitutes that humanity. For Franzen, memories can be covered up temporarily but never destroyed, unless, as we have said, it is caused by a neurological disease - in which case it would imply, according to the author, the inevitable obliteration of the human being, and the death of one's identity. We are what we remember - and once we lose that, the writer seems to think, we are nothing. This essay analyzes Jonathan Franzen's approach to memory as related to identity and history, and the role of active forgetting in his most recent novel to date, *Purity*.

Memory occupies an unprecedented position in critical theory nowadays. Remembering has become a crucial issue, as is evidenced by the proliferation of commemorative events, memorabilia, publications of memoirs, autobiographies and historical novels, revivals, remakes, etc. All this has reinforced a growing interest in cultural memory. However, although remembering the past is important in the construction of a (trans)national, cultural, generational or personal identity, the road to remembrance presents many obstacles. Some of these are external to the subject;

This essay analyzes Jonathan Franzen's approach to memory as related to identity and history, and the role of active forgetting in his last novel to this day, *Purity*.

political or socio-economical erasures of archival information, for instance, which destroy access to the past. Others are internal - as in the case of degenerative mental illnesses, like Alzheimer's, or short-term memory loss due to a traumatic event. At other times, these obstacles to memory are actively provoked by a subject who wants to erase the past, to forget events that (s)he does not want to be inscribed in his or her life. The importance of recalling the past is unquestionable but remembering is inevitably linked to its opposite.

The indissoluble connection between memory and forgetting was affirmed by Sigmund Freud (2017), who argued for the need to recover the repressed (forgotten) in the unconscious. Among other interpretations of the connection between remembering and forgetting in relation to history are those by Friedrich Nietzsche (1997), Marc Augé (2004), and Paul Ricoeur (2004). Cultural memory critic Andreas Huyssen perceptively states the problem thus: "For the more we are asked to remember in the wake of the information explosion and the marketing of history, the more we seem to be in danger of forgetting and the stronger the need to forget. At issue is the distinction between usable pasts and disposable data" (2003, p. 18). Memories are important not only for what they transmit, but for what is silenced, what is necessary and what is not. As such amnesia, whether active or passive, challenges the presence of hegemonic narratives of the past; forgetting is thus associated with destruction and death and, as a consequence, it provokes fear. One of the reasons for this is the implicit dissolution of the identity of the subject via the disappearance of memory. Jonathan Franzen's father had Alzheimer's, and in a brilliant and moving New Yorker essay from 2001, "My Father's Brain: What Alzheimer's Takes Away," the author discusses his reluctance to accept his father's condition. The text is a reflection on memory and identity, and also on the family and the relationship among its members, a subject that is central to all Franzen's books. Memory is important for human beings in the sense that it keeps the past alive in the present, and provides an identity, stories to live by. Memory creates history, and when you lose that history, the author seems to think, you become nothing.

In Franzen's latest novel, Purity, all the characters except the titular protagonist seek very actively to forget their pasts. The motivated erasure of memories thus becomes a strategy that the characters use to survive and face the present according to a (fake) narrative that they have constructed. But is motivated forgetting possible? How can memories be completely suppressed in an active way? I am interested in exploring how the role of forgetting in Franzen's novel represents the need in our contemporary society to deny, hide, or erase uncomfortable data from our historical or personal archives, stories which we do not want to accept, recognize, and much less make known to the public. This is also related to how we manage information in the age of technology, how we handle the "selection" of what is to be the official story, and how we rewrite our own history.

In Purity, forgetting is not caused by aging or neurological damage. It is an active and conscious process by which the characters choose to forget certain episodes of their lives so as to be able to construct new identities. Their erased memories include murder, economic privileges derived from illegal or unethical commercial procedures, and dark sexual episodes. The obsession with forgetting the past links the lives of the main characters and structures the narrative of the novel. It is a novel about erasures and rewritings in which, as some reviewers have pointed out, we find the autobiographical elements which Franzen has covered in his non-fiction: a domineering

mother, an eccentric artist ex-wife, and a seducer and womanizing friend (David Foster Wallace), as well as the experiences of the writer when he was young in Germany (Tanenhaus, 2015). There is even an ironical implicit allusion to Jonathan Safran Foer, Jonathan *Savoir Faire* (Franzen, 2015, p. 206), the author of *Eating Animals*, that connects to the name of the author in a self-referential way: "So many Jonathans. A plague of literary Jonathans. If you read only the *New York Times Book Review*, you'd think it was the most common male name in America. Synonymous with talent, greatness. Ambition, vitality" (Franzen, 2015, p. 207).

Purity tells the story of Purity (Pip) Tyler (the connections with Dickens are obvious), a young girl to whom her mother refuses to reveal her father's identity. She raises her on her own, trying to keep her as pure as possible (hence the title of the novel). But Pip comes into contact

Andreas, as a hacker, creates the Sunlight Project, while Tom is the founder of the Denver Independent, an online independent journal.

with a German activist, Annagret, who in turn puts her in touch with Andreas Wolf, a hacker and seducer who works from his refuge in Bolivia on a project (the Sunlight Project) to disclose secret information to the world on confidential, political and economic issues (there are many similarities with Julian Assange, who is mentioned several times in the novel, and who at the time of writing is living in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London). The novel is, in Diane Johnson's words, "a complex narrative of fates intertwined and twinned, international crimes, dark secrets, a whirl of events unfolding at fairy-tale or comic-book speed." Other characters include Leila Helou, a Texan of Lebanese origin, and Tom Aberant, both journalists. Leila and Tom are lovers, but Leila is married to a writer and former professor who has been living at home in seclusion following an accident. In a strange nineteenth-century, quasi-Dickensian turn of events, at the end of the novel we discover that Tom is Pip's father, and, coincidentally, also the young man who Andreas met in Berlin after the fall of the Wall, and who knew Andreas's darkest secret: that he had killed a man when he was young. It was Andreas, we learn, who used Pip to find Tom because he wanted to know whether he was going to disclose his secret.

The novel is about knowing and not knowing, forgetting and remembering, hiding and unveiling secrets, both private and public, and the role of the media and the internet in these processes. Andreas and Tom are two sides of the same coin: Andreas, as a hacker, creates the Sunlight Project, while Tom is the founder of the Denver Independent, an online independent

journal. Both are concerned with exposing the truth. But what is the truth, exactly? Do you tell everything, or do you select it by erasing what is not convenient?

Franzen's previous novels dealt with previous types of paranoia: "political skulduggery in *The Twenty-Seventh City*, mysterious earthquakes in Strong Motion, mind-numbing pharmaceuticals

Purity demonstrates that the obsession of the characters with forgetting only shows that the past always ends up appearing, and that complete erasure is impossible.

in *The Corrections*, and ecological and military malfeasance in *Freedom*" (Tanenhaus, 2015). In his novel, Franzen unveils "the false idolatry of the digital age, its pretense of truth-telling and revelation, its ideological "purity" that reduces to monomania and fanaticism" (Tanenhaus, 2015). The issues at stake include defining what the truth is, what we can reveal about ourselves and the world around us to be able to build a better future, and what we should try to forget or erase, if this is possible at all. *Purity* demonstrates that the obsession of the characters with forgetting shows only that the past will always end up making an appearance, and that complete erasure is impossible. For Franzen, even though active forgetting could be potentially liberating, it is not so. Instead, it leads to destruction.

This is a far cry from the notion of forgetting as beneficial, which was proposed by Friedrich Nietzsche in "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History" (1874). For the German philosopher, active forgetting is selective remembering, the recognition that not all past forms of knowledge, and not all experiences, are valuable for present and future life. For Nietzsche, history is useful as long as it serves the living. Animals (he gives the example of a cow) are happy because they live unhistorically, but the human being must carry the burden of the past. Happiness derives from sensing things unhistorically, and from living only the present moment. Living historically, thinking in excess about the past, can bring destruction:

> A man who wanted to feel historically through and through would be like one forcibly deprived of sleep, or an animal that had to live only by rumination and ever repeated rumination. Thus: it is possible to live almost without memory, and to live happily moreover, as the animal demonstrates; but it is altogether impossible to live at all without forgetting. Or, to express my theme even more simply: there is a degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thin whether this living thing be a man or a people or a culture. (p. 62)

Happiness derives from sensing things unhistorically, living only the present moment. Living historically, thinking in excess about the past, can bring destruction

While for Plato forgetting marks the collapse at the very origin of thought, for Nietzsche, forgetting is evoked for its potential to save humans from history, which is regarded, at least in part, as a disaster

So, remembering (living historically) and forgetting (living unhistorically) are both necessary, but the excess of either is bad: remembering too much leads to destruction, and according to Nietzsche oblivion turns human beings into happy but unconscious beasts. However, he affirms that the capacity of feeling unhistorically is to a certain degree more important, and more basic for humans, than living historically. Whereas forgetting everything is not desirable, selective memory, or active forgetting, is beneficial for human beings. Nietzsche's understanding of forgetting stands in marked contrast to that of Plato. While for Plato forgetting marks the collapse at the very origin of thought, for Nietzsche, forgetting is evoked for its potential to save humans from history, which is regarded, at least in part, as a disaster (Ramadanovic, 2002).

In other words, Nietzsche believes in the need for selective memory. That is to say, we should not avoid the past, but regard it critically. For the philosopher, there are three attitudes towards the past: historical, unhistorical, superhistorical, and three methods for history: monumental, antiquarian and critical (1874). The monumental method believes that the greatness of the past will be possible once again - magnifying the good deeds and erasing the bad moments - a deceitful approach; the antiquarian cultivates the past by emphasizing the customary, and traditional values - but this can lead to degeneration when the past no longer is "inspired by the fresh life of the present" (p. 75); the critical method implies being oppressed by a present moment, and having the desire to cast off the load of the past at any price (desire to erase it), and it passes judgement on history. Like the monumental method, it implies forgetting, but not magnifying. The critical method is for Nietzsche the most useful:

> If he is to live, man must possess and from time to time employ the strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past: he does this by bringing it before the tribunal, scrupulously examining it and finally condemning it; every past, however, is worthy to be condemned for that is the nature of human things: human violence and weakness have always played a mighty role in them. (pp. 75-76).

But destroying the past is dangerous, as it implies rejecting our negative side: "For since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors, and indeed of their crime" (p. 76). By forgetting, or trying to erase that past, we try to give ourselves "a past *a posteriori*." This, according to Nietzsche, is problematic because the second nature is usually weaker than the first. Every person, society and culture uses the past sometimes monumentally, sometimes as antiquarian history, and sometimes as critical history for the purpose of living: "This is the natural relationship to history of an age, a culture, and a people with its history" (p. 77).

Franzen's novel addresses the relationship to history of individuals, people, and cultures. By locating the novel in the contemporary U.S. and in Post-World War II East Germany, he addresses several issues, such as U.S. capitalism, communism, and the access to information through the media and the internet: "it seemed as if the Internet was governed more by fear: the fear of unpopularity and uncoolness, the fear of missing out, the fear of being flamed or forgotten" (2015, p. 449). The one thing that all the characters, except Pip, have in common is their desire to forget their pasts: Pip's mother, Anabel, wants to forget who her father is (Tom Aberant), and who she really is

(a rich heiress). She has raised her daughter in the ignorance of the money she might have had, because for her that money was crooked. Hers is a case of active forgetting, and the rejection of an identity she does not comply with. She did not approve of the methods her father used to earn money and has therefore decided that the only way to shed this burden was to erase her identity, as she told Tom before she married him: "The money is already ruining my brothers. I'm not going to let it ruin me. But that's not even the reason. The reason is the money has blood on it. I can smell it in my checking account, the blood from a river of meat. That is what McCaskill is, a river of meat. They trade in grain, too, but even there a lot of it goes to feed the river" (2015, p. 357).

> When Andreas leaves the Stasi archives with a plastic bag containing his files and those about the disappearance of the man he had killed, he is faced with the TV cameras that are there recording the fall of the Wall, and the citizens are aking over the official places of the regime.

Andreas Wolf also has many secrets he wishes to consign to oblivion: from the relationship with his mother, from which we can infer a possible Oedipus complex which led to a life of sexual promiscuity, to a murder he committed to protect a woman, and which he confessed to Tom because he needed his help to bury the body (a metaphor for keeping the past hidden). Andreas's parents are members of the communist party, and he has caused scandal as a younger man by writing an acrostic in a poem making fun of the socialist regime. Later in the novel, Andreas asks his father to locate the files that the Stasi keeps on him, seeking to erase the traces of his crimes. By erasing the documentary proofs, he hopes to clear his conscience and to be able to forget that it had ever happened. His father helps him, despite not being his biological father. His real father is a former student of his mother's, who appears following some years in prison for treason; she writes a book about it unveiling the truth, a book which also has to be destroyed. When Andreas leaves the Stasi archives with a plastic bag containing his files and those about the disappearance of the man he had killed, he is faced with the TV cameras that are there recording the fall of the Wall, while the citizens are taking over the regime's institutions.

Andreas's parents are members of the communist party, and it was a big scandal when he was young and wrote an acrostic in a poem making fun of the socialist regime.

Trying to avoid being caught by the Stasi, Andreas pretends that he is there to monitor the work of the Citizen's Committee of Normannenstrasse. He accuses the Stasi of whitewashing in the archives: "This is a country of festering secrets and toxic lies. Only the strongest of sunlight can disinfect it" (2015, p. 167), as he tells the TV cameras. He suddenly becomes a media hero and names his new project Sunlight. However, while his job is to unveil everybody's secrets, he keeps his own files under his mattress (again, another metaphor for active forgetting). When me meets with Pip in Bolivia, and tries to seduce her, he tells her about his theory of secrets:

> There's the imperative to keep secrets, and the imperative to have them known. How do you know that you're a person, distinct from other people? By keeping certain things to yourself. You guard them inside you, because, if you don't, there's no distinction between inside and outside. Secrets are the way you know you even have an inside. A radical exhibitionist is a person who has forfeited his identity. But identity in a vacuum is also meaningless. Sooner or later, the inside of you needs a witness. Otherwise you're just a cow, a cat, a stone, a thing in the world, trapped in your thingness. To have an identity, you have to believe that other identities equally exist. You need closeness with other people. And how is closeness built? By sharing secrets.... Your identity exists at the intersection of these lines of trust. (2015, p. 275)

Pip responds to this theory by exposing Andreas's hypocrisy when he says that one has to trust a person to keep a secret, while at the same time his job consists of exposing others' secrets. "It's my identity" (2015, p. 275), he replies.

The ending of the novel, following full disclosure, suggests that no matter how hard one tries to forget and keep the past hidden, it will always reappear - sometimes to destroy one, as it is the case of Andreas, at other times to help you, as in the case of the money Pip finally inherits, and which allows her to pay her college debt. Andreas has to die because Tom was going to unveil the truth about him which he had tried so hard to forget. Moreover, the truth about Pip's real identity is finally revealed. Thus, the novel's "happy" ending, with Andreas's death, Tom and Pip finally reunited, Pip with her boyfriend, and Tom and Anabel "talking," or rather fighting, seems to indicate that active forgetting is not liberating, but may instead bring about madness and destruction. Like Plato, for Franzen, forgetting is a predicament of human beings (Ramadanovic, 2001), but complete forgetting is not possible because there is always something which cannot be erased.

For Nietzsche (1997), the most fruitful approach to history is based on forgetting certain things in order to be able to move on. This, for Franzen (2015), is a disgrace. Human beings should never forget. Forgetting equals death: secrets always rise to the surface because active forgetting is an imposture. The fabulation that one creates, the faked life that Anabel or Andrea try to lead by hiding their real selves, cannot succeed because human beings cannot step outside of history, of our stories. For Franzen (2015), whether we like it or not - even if we try to erase those parts of our lives that we dislike (as individuals, as people, and as cultures), and even if we actively attempt to forget - the past, history, can never be silenced.

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Aesthetics of Negativity in US Television Fiction and Comics: *Here* by Richard McGuire and *Twin Peaks, the Return*

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Aesthetics of Negativity in US Television Fiction and Comics: *Here* by Richard McGuire and *Twin Peaks, the Return*

In the original version of Richard McGuire's comic *Here*, published in the magazine *Raw* in 1989, an initial panel depicting the empty corner of a living room at an unspecified point in time introduces a journey in time over a fixed space, in a to-and-fro of temporal leaps ranging from the age of the dinosaurs to the year 2030. The first panel is an almost abstract image, just a few lines converging on a point, verging on an illusion of space and perspective, depicting one corner of a living room next to a window. This article begins with this first image of an empty space, stripped bare, that underpins the whole development of *Here*, to venture a hypothesis of a negative aesthetic, a visual logic of emptying out and tearing in contemporary US television fiction series and comics.

In some of the most significant practices in the context of recent innovations in comics and television, there appears to be a clear continuity with earlier explorations in the realm of visual arts, particularly in painting, based on the premise of a negative approach, whose expression can be analyzed using philosophical and even theological theoretical sources. To study the presence of the logic of emptying out, opening up and tearing in works like *Here*, or in Season 3 of David Lynch's *Twin Peaks: The Return* (Showtime Networks, 2017), or even in the works of the cartoonist Chris Ware, it is necessary to turn to methodological and theoretical tools similar to those needed for an analysis of the paintings of Mark Rothko or the work of the Anglo-Indian artist Anish Kapoor. Through a contextualization, a comparative analysis and finally a hermeneutic approach, it is the aim of this paper to attempt a broader explanation of the experimental logic emerging within contemporary popular culture in the English-speaking world, and particularly in the United States.

1. A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICA

The key feature of the first version of *Here*, which constituted a milestone in innovative comics, was McGuire's ability to use secondary narrative elements to draw out a tension that has been implicit in the comic strip since its origins: the status of the comic strip panel as an open window on the concatenation between past, present and future, on the one hand, and the reader's freedom to travel through all the moments in time laid out in the panoply on the page (Pintor, 2017a). In the six pages of *Here*, the accessibility of all the different moments in time on the page was related to the use of a technique of insets or overlapping panels. In this way, different points in time open onto others, in a journey towards the origins constructed firstly out of ordinary family moments, and then out of historical events, all of which occurred in the same space.

The status of the comic strip panel as an open window on the concatenation between past, present and future, on the one hand, and the reader's freedom to travel through all the moments in time laid out in the panoply on the page

The journey through time articulated in the cut between images and the pantheist tone that permeates *Here* aligns with the editing techniques used in the movies of Jonas Mekas, or particularly in Terrence Malick movies like *The Tree of Life* (2011) and *Voyage of Time* (2016). All these works exhibit a poetics associated with the American transcendentalism of Emerson and Walt Whitman, which McGuire expresses in a context as open to experimentation as the magazine *Raw* (1980-1986; 1989-1991), directed by Art Spiegelman and Françoise Mouly, as an intellectual counterpoint to the rough underground style of the magazine *Weirdo* (1981-1993) created by Robert Crumb. However, what for Malick is a journey through vital moments, in search of divine grace or a kind of transcendence, in McGuire becomes, through the strategy of inset comic panels, a negative voyage, an exploration of ellipsis, and the threat of infinite openness.

As in the case of filmmakers with a close affinity with painting, such as Peter Greenaway, who in the same era released movies like *The Cook, the Thief, His Wife & Her Lover* (1989) and *Prospero's Books* (1991), the fact that *Here* happened to be published around the same time as the appearance of Windows software could be cited to explain the logic of windows and different points in time opening up in constant overlaps. However, it is the expression of tearing and opening that makes the first version of *Here* so unique, with its constant allusion to the possibility of the primordial void behind all moments in time. In contrast to the movie *The Tree of Life*, there is no

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voice-over, no text that guides the journey; instead, the boldness of the work lies in the act of the montage itself, in the juxtaposed articulation of discrete temporal frames where the narrative hierarchization is left up to the reader.

The visual beauty of McGuire's more extensive development of the first version of the comic strip in the album *Here* (2014) gives the journey through time a more pictorial dimension, again in tune with the spectacular use of the 70mm format by Mallick. The use of color and the absence of the reticular structure of traditional comic panels intensify the sensation of a unique space. From the living room in a house, the different games, conversations, births and absences of a family saga respond to and link in with one another, in a multiplicity of parallel moments in the planet's distant past and foggy future. The first panel in the original 1989 version of the strip, only a few angled lines, is expanded now into a series of fourteen pages by way of prologue.

On the first of these pages, a window that maintains the page white background also reproduces a corner of the house, enveloped in a gloom of grey tones very similar to those used by the Danish painter Vilhelm Hammershøi. On the second page, almost as if it was a musical movement, the shades of grey are once again organized around the whiteness of the light that enters through the window and is silhouetted against the fireplace. In the pages that follow, in a kind of dance, shot and reverse shot, window and fireplace exchange different lights. These pages evoke different moments, but always as a huge mass of color around a central blank hole, until the series of rhythms comes to life with the abrupt appearance of the year and a human figure, a woman appearing in 1957, without knowing why she came to the window.

The image of the woman, always with the page dominated by these internal empty spaces, is followed by the figure of a cat in 1999, of a virgin landscape in 1623 and, once again, the female figure in 1957. From this moment and throughout most of the album (except for the moments before and after the existence of the house), both the window and the fireplace continue being two blank spaces. These spaces appear to reveal a deeper dimension beyond the cadence of the windows that capture different moments, linking together actions that are nearly always mundane, lacking in any obvious *pathos*. "Life has a flair for rhyming events," says one of the characters much later, in a panel marked 1775. Far from appearing like ghosts, all the human figures peopling *Here* manage to make the real specter the reader, the wandering owner of a gaze which, as in the movies of Terence Davies, constantly loses what it longs to hold onto.

However, the basic emotion that dominates this work is not, as in Terence Davies' movies, tied up so much with family memory, a bitter melancholy, or the tragic reality of irreversibility. *Here* evokes the shimmering gleam of moments that act like buoys against the rushing flow of time. But behind the hymn to the forests, cultures, births, and deaths that parade through the space of the house in *Here*, in an echo of Robert Crumb's *A Short History of America* (1979) is clearly discernible, McGuire displays a keen attention to the gaps, the intervals. At the end of the road that begins in American poetry with Whitman is always the negative approach of Emily Dickinson's blank spaces, their extraordinary revelation of what is lost between the images.

"We grow accustomed to the Dark,"[1] she declares in one of her poems, while in another she concludes what could be the defense of another way of writing poetry, drawing comics or making movies: "Until the Cheated Eye / Shuts arrogantly — in the Grave / Another way — to see —."[2] It is not so much a case of evoking a journey or a direct tension towards abstraction — in this sense there are much more obvious examples of abstraction in comics, from Manfred Sommer to Renato Calligaro[3] — as of elaborating a constellation of negatives and gaps around a central void, while maintaining the precision of the figuration. In certain ways, the way McGuire works with time is analogous to what the Canadian cartoonist Martin Vaughn-James does with space in *The Cage* (1975) or to the mechanisms that underpin certain works by Marc-Antoine Mathieu, such as *Julius-Corentin Acquefacques, prisonnier des rêves* (1991) and *3"* (2011).

These pages evoke different moments, but always as a huge mass of color around a central blank hole

In *3"*, the story of a murder in a sports stadium is explained through a concatenation of reflections in glasses, screens and mirrors, to which one more panel could always be added. Similarly, among the panels of *Here* a new opening could always be inserted, but it would never have a clarifying purpose, as in the case of *3"*, since there is no generic plot that underpins the album; instead it would point to that "other way to see" alluded to by Dickinson. In the final panel of *Here*, when the woman in 1957 remembers that she has come to the living room window to retrieve a book, the work is revealed to be a kind of Proustian unfolding through recognition, like an accordion which, once all the layers of time have been exposed, returns to the same spot. It is in fact a strategy similar to that employed by David Lynch in *Twin Peaks: The Return*. Just as the idea of the central blank hole graphically dominates the whole work, narratively, there is also a central, inexplicable opaqueness behind the passage of time.

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[1] Emily Dickinson, "The Tint I cannot take – is best –", in Emily Dickinson, *The Poems of Emily Dickinson*, 1998), p. 666.
[2] Emily Dickinson, "We grow accustomed to the dark", in Emily Dickinson, Op. cit. p. 452-453.
[3] Notable in Sommer's case is the series titled Secuencia nº1, 2, 3, 4 y 5 (1981).
See also Molotiu, A. (Ed.) *Abstract Comics: The Anthology* (2009) and Anderson, Kimball et al., *Comics as Poetry* (2012), as well as the work of Tamryn Bennett (2014).

2. THE FRUIT OF NOTHING

In contrast with the Shakespearean approach that has dominated the golden age of drama beginning in television fiction after 9/11, *Twin Peaks: The Return* establishes a pact with the spectator that is not based on the premise of a self-contained story and does not invoke the resources of Elizabethan drama. Each episode appears to be conceived as a visit to the studio, to the workshop of the artist, as a navigation through the different dimensional thresholds and windows that open up around the original location of the town of *Twin Peaks*. In this sense, its approach bears a closer relationship to the non-narrative strategies of *Here* or *The Cage* than the standard forms of television fiction, even if the end of the series deliberately aspires to a closure of the story, a return to the starting point.

The development of recurring motifs in *Twin Peaks* results in scenes understood as paintings, experiments, and possibilities of a multiple universe resounding

In this context, the development of recurring motifs in Twin Peaks results in scenes understood as paintings, experiments, and possibilities of a multiple universe resounding, first of all, with the history of the United States since World War II, and, secondly, with the intuition of a much older temporal dimension rooted in nature. In the arc of the twenty-seven years separating the first season (ABC: 1990-91) from the last season of *Twin Peaks*, there is a dialogue with time and an intention to identify the negative flipsides of a sinister eternity. As in Here, there is a return to the starting point, but expressed in an image filled with *pathos*: the blood-curdling scream of the actress Sheryl Lee, a Laura whom Agent Cooper (Kyle McLachlan) believes he has resurrected and returned to her home.

While the basic approach that characterizes both Lynch's painting and filming style involves zooming in on a detail that betrays the apparent tranquility of the whole, exploring the imbalance between the wide shot and the fragment, between the exquisitely cut grass and the decayed ear in *Blue Velvet* (1986), both the last and the first episodes of the third season of *Twin Peaks* emerge onto a non-existent outside world, flattened after an absence of almost three decades, both for the characters and for the spectators. The peaceful whispering of the Douglas firs swaying in the wind, the hum of the Packard Sawmill and the music of Badalamenti accompanying each of Audrey's light steps through her father's hotel or the RR Café in the first two seasons are replaced now by the silence of an open world.

In his book *Catching the Big Fish* (2006), David Lynch suggests that for something to be able to appear, it is first necessary to create the void

This initial empty space acts as a catalyst, in the same way as the initial empty
panel in Here

In consonance with Lynch's and McGuire's sources, Ware uses formulas for emptying the central space of the page

In his book *Catching the Big Fish* (2006), David Lynch suggests that for something to be able to appear, it is first necessary to create the void. *Twin Peaks* opens by establishing in that world of The Open *(Das Offene,* Rilke called it in the eighth of his *Duíno Elegies*[4]) the maximum embodiment of power: a huge, empty glass cube.

Resembling a Faraday cage, the cube is located in an attic in Manhattan, which along with Philadelphia, Las Vegas, and Buenos Aires, forms part of a new geography for the series. In a meticulous ritual of invocation, several surveillance cameras record the emptiness of the cube, which is watched over by a young man who is unable to foresee the appearance, first, of a maleficent presence, and later, of Agent Cooper.

This initial empty space acts as a catalyst, in the same way as the initial empty panel in *Here* and just like Chris Ware's central panels of empty and torn spaces in both *Jimmy Corrigan, the Smartest Kid on Earth* (2000), and (especially) *The Big Book* (*I Just Want to Fall Asleep*) (Acme Novelty Library 18), one of the parts of *Building Stories* (2012). This work of Ware is not so much a comic book as a box, like the boxed assemblages of the artist Joseph Cornell, with fourteen different pieces—tabloids, notebooks, strip cartoons, an album bound in cloth and even a screen or game board—whose stories are organized around the everyday trials and solitudes of a woman with an amputated leg. The strategy of keeping the center of the page empty is expressed in *The Big Book* in the image of an empty notebook (pp. 23-24), the lintel of a door (pp. 32-33 and 34-35), an open orchid (pp. 46-47), and even a woman's vulva (pp. 42,45).

In consonance with Lynch's and McGuire's sources, Ware uses formulas for emptying the central space of the page developed previously by classical illustrators in the American press, like George Herriman, the author of *Krazy Kat* (1913-1944), and Frank King, the creator of *Gasoline Alley* (1918-). A gradual emptying, like that advocated by the artist Jorge Oteiza (2003) when reflecting on his sculptural works, produces an effect of liberation, of asceticism or, in terms of the negative topology of the German mystic Meister Eckhart, a way of giving birth to the "fruit of nothing" in the empty space of the soul. To this end, the detachment (*Abgeschiedenheit*) that makes possible the incarnation of God in man, the process of *kenosis*, is as important as the breakthrough (*Durchbruch*) that reveals the ground (*grûnt*) on which the transcendental encounter can occur.

The breakthrough and the opening of the threshold between worlds is not only the symbol that characterizes all David Lynch's work (Pintor, 2017b), but also the unique quality of the actors' gestures in the third season of *Twin Peaks*. The ritual precision of the gestures in the first two seasons of the series becomes, in the final episodes, an intention to tear at the darkness of the image, to gain access to the transcendence that lies beyond the murder of Laura Palmer. Both Laura and her mother withdraw their own faces in respective symmetrical scenes to reveal an abyss (*abgrûnt*) of light in the first case and of darkness in the second. Similarly, there are numerous vortexes that open up to that other space explored by the filmmaker in the heterotopia of the Black Lodge, the Club Silencio in *Mulholland Drive* (David Lynch, 2001), or the radiator in *Eraserhead* (David Lynch, 1977).

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[4] Upon which only an animal could gaze, since the human gaze is always on the world and far from that nowhere without no (*Nirgends ohne Nicht*).

3. AN APOPHATIC AESTHETIC

What is portrayed as a containment of the abyss of The Real in Lynch's work up until to *Inland Empire* (2006) in *Twin Peaks: The Return* foreshadows a negative return of the sacred that emerges out of the liminal void. Not only does the slapstick, inherited from the filmmaker Jacques Tati, that characterizes Dougie, an ill-fated, childlike, inarticulate Cooper (both played by McLachlan), constitute a prodigious figuration of the holy madman, but it is also in this third season, beneath the torn surface, that the light emerges most. Just as in Lynch's most recent paintings, the canvas often reveals a bright world beyond compared to the dark and abject experience of the home in the black canvases of his early period, a kind of exercise that comic strip authors like Frank Miller and Bill Sienkiewicz had already experimented with in *Elektra Assassin* (1986-87) or Grant Morrison and Dave McKean in *Arkham Asylum* (1989).

In this respect, there does not seem to be a substantial difference between the visual attitude of breakdown and deepening sometimes found in Sienkewicz, McKean or Lynch and which characterizes works by Anish Kapoor like *Place* (1985) and *The Healing of St. Thomas* (1989-1990), or in the ultimate purpose of the tears in Lucio Fontana's concetti spaziali in the 1960s. In his study of the apophatic aesthetic ("apophatic" from the Greek word ἀποφάναι, meaning "to say no", "to negate") based on Kapoor's work, the theorist Amador Vega (2004) points out how the void of the space inside the wound, the tear, offers a new language that emerges from sacrifice and contemplation to posit itself as a pronouncement or an "opening up to others".

However, the sacrificial device, which is central to the series by J. J. Abrams and to the infiltration of superheroes from the Marvel series—*Daredevil* (Netflix, 2015-), Jessica Jones (Netflix: 2015-) or *Luke Cage* (Netflix: 2017-)—is reduced in Lynch's case to the distance of a death that occurred in the pilot episode and of a quest that is more visual than strictly narrative. The excerpt from Eckhart's sermon on the Conversion of St. Paul on the Road to Damascus highlighted by Vega in his discussion of Kapoor, "[…] when he rose up from the ground with his eyes open, he saw nothing" (Vega, 2004, p. 155), not only alludes to an inner vision, but also evokes its opposite: the impossibility of finding a response to the outward gaze that we find at the beginning of Kafka's *The Castle* (*Das Schloß*, 1926), when it is the very negation of the image that acquires a gaze of its own and contemplates the character, the reader.

Just where the castle in Kafka's story ought to be, all that is revealed is a thick, dark fog. Prior to any word or definition, the abyss of that void with intended as a way out was also the ultimate endeavor of artists like Rothko, who, like Fontana, worked on series, variations, and open processes. Lynch has never been satisfied with a single figure to construct a character, and from *Lost Highway* (1997) to *Inland Empire* (2006) he repeatedly juxtaposed two narratives around a central hole, around which the symbolic order of a single, split character collapses. Like the black hole which, in the last years of his life, began making its presence felt in Rothko's paintings despite his efforts to contain it with reality, the symbolic dimension of color, for Lynch, sex and murder form the core of a trauma that traps its characters in a loop between reality and flight into a fantasy that is even more horrific.

How the void of the space inside the wound, the tear, offers a new language that emerges from sacrifice and contemplation to posit itself as a pronouncement or an "opening up to others."

This overflowing of the abyss in this case acquires a historical, *Godardian* dimension, with its embodiment of the origins of contemporary evil in the explosion of the first atomic test in New Mexico in 1945

This overflowing of the abyss in this case acquires a historical, *Godardian* dimension, with its embodiment of the origins of contemporary evil in the explosion of the first atomic test in New Mexico in 1945. The eighth episode functions with the autonomous, self-contained dimension of an episode of *The Twilight Zone,* (CBS: 1959-1964) or *Black Mirror* (Channel 4: 2011-2014; Netflix: 2016-), but at the same time it opens at a precise historical location. The domination of certain images on the limits of the abstract to the sound of Krzysztof Penderecki's music not only constitutes a re-reading of the experimental movies of Stan Brakhage, Jordan Belson or Bruce Conner, but also the foundation of a negativity whose ultimate meaning, capable of transcending the representational, collides with a nihilist mode of negativity prone to expression in forms and figures of horror.

The mushroom cloud, the hobos, Cooper's evil *doppelgänger,* the portrait of Kafka that looms over Gordon Cole's office, the images of Cooper appearing in the glass cube and through the electrical power outlet, the decapitated body, and the mutant animal resulting from the explosion are examples of a rich figuration around which the concept of negativity can no longer be read as synonymous with a negative approach, serving instead as the seed of a dramatic temporality, of a plurality of images and idols.

The imaginary that feeds Lynch's poetics is the same one that gave rise to American comic strip classics like Chester Gould's Dick Tracy (1931-1977) or the post-war strips of EC Comics

When it slips into the mouth of a young girl, the strange insect-frog hybrid born a decade after the atomic explosion contaminates the Edenic purity of the 1950s in the United States, an idea Lynch has narrated so many times, recreating the aesthetic of Norman Rockwell or even the ingenuous iconographic repertoire of the etiquette manual *Good Times in Our Streets.*

The imaginary that feeds Lynch's poetics is the same one that gave rise to American comic strip classics like Chester Gould's *Dick Tracy* (1931-1977) or the post-war strips of EC Comics, a dark, B-grade universe perpetuated by illustrators like Daniel Clowes in *Like a Velvet Glove Cast in Iron* (1989-1993) or Charles Burns in *Black Hole* (1995-2005), and which, in a subtler way, is palpable in the pages of David Mazzucchelli's *Asteros Polyp* (2009). Each of its chapters is headed by a panel that acts as an abyss, in the middle of the page, leading to the lost highway in the header in the last chapter. In Twin Peaks, whether the girl is Killer Bob's mother or Laura Palmer's grandmother is less important than the depiction of an evil conceived as a distortion or perversion of a pre-established ritual.

"This is the water, and this is the well. Drink full and descend. The horse is the white of the eyes, and dark within." This mantra, used by Judy's archangels of evil to silence the music of the Platters in the eighth episode, expresses a form of darkness present in all of Lynch's work, from his black paintings to the final scream in *Twin Peaks: The Return*. Lynch tunes into a nihilist imaginary of evil understood as an intrusion, or as an absence of good and *eudaimonia*–εὐδαιμονία, wellbeing, happiness (Nussbaum, 2001). To the presence of a negative aesthetic in a subtractive and theological sense, *Twin Peaks: The Return* adds an invocation of figurations of evil that are simply responses to the need to represent the site of negativity in contemporary society.

4. IN PRAISE OF NEGATIVITY

"We live in a time that is poor in negativity," argues the philosopher Byung-Chul Han (2012, p. 17), echoing Heidegger; an era where the *disciplinary society* described by Foucault (1976), still governed by the "no" and the prohibition, has been giving rise to a *performance society.* In such a society, the lamentation of the depressed individual that "nothing is possible" can only be explained because the central value cultivated is the opposite: "nothing is impossible." The need to sustain one's own identity (Ehrenberg, 2008) in a context characterized by the positive promise that one can be anything ultimately proves exhausting. The gloom that pervades television series like *Mad Men* (AMC, 2007-2015), *Breaking Bad* (AMC, 2008-2013) or *The Leftovers* (HBO, 2014-2017) appear as a response to the excess of positivity of societies based on the *American Dream* (Pintor, 2015).

Like gloom, evil also appears in very different incarnations in the series of the last twenty years only as a way of channeling the tension caused by an excess of positivity. The realist evil of *The Wire* (HBO, 2002-2009), *Treme* (HBO, 2010-2013) and *Show Me a Hero* (HBO, 2015); the evil incorporated in the genre's discourse of *The Sopranos* (HBO, 1999-2007), *Boardwalk Empire* (HBO, 2010-2014), *True Detective* (HBO, 2014-) and *The Handmaid's Tale*, (Hulu, 2017); the fantasy universe of *Walking Dead* (AMC, 2010-) or *Game of Thrones* (HBO, 2011-); and the documentary horror of *The Jinx: The Life and Deaths of Robert Durst* (HBO, 2015) are all manifestations of a need to create stories based on a negativity understood, following Heidegger, as Nichtheit, i.e., as a tragic vector of time and the essential condition of being.[5]

All of McGuire's and Ware's work, as well as the work of others of their generation like Daniel Clowes, Charles Burns, Seth (Gregory Gallant), Chester Brown, Joe Matt, or even some of the young "underground" illustrators on the American scene, like Simon Hanselmann, is based on a desire to portray the cracks in an excess of positivity behind which dwell the great, negated phantoms of American fiction and society: solitude, alienation, the protection and pressure of the

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[5] Based on a critical re-reading of Hegel, and on phenomenology, Heidegger points out in *Being and Time* (1927) § 82: "Thus Hegel can define the essence of spirit formally and apophantically as the negation of a negation. This 'absolute negativity' gives a logically formalized interpretation of Descartes' *cogito me cogitare rem* wherein he sees the essence of *conscientia*." And he adds: "Time is 'abstract' negativity. As 'intuited becoming', it is the differentiated self-differentiation that 'is there', that is, objectively present. As something objectively present and thus external to spirit, time has no power over the concept, but the concept is rather 'the power of time'."

Desire to portray the cracks in an excess of positivity behind which dwell the great, negated phantoms of American fiction and society

identical and the standardized, the violence of consensus. At least since the 1950s, the house with a yard and pool has been the incentive that the "American way of life" offers the performance society, but it is also its greatest hoax. Like any other house in the paintings of Hopper and Hockney or in the stories of John Updike and John Cheever, the home portrayed, through a negative approach adopted by these artists, is the emblem of the space of sameness and the excess of normalcy.

In the same way, for Lynch, all these cases are characterized by the desire to turn the void into a compensatory space for the depictions of the home that promise a preconceived happiness. It is only in this way that the image of the empty, abandoned house at the end of John Cheever's short story "The Swimmer" (1964) can be understood. In the end, the tearing and subtraction referred to above are meaningless if they are not accompanied by their opposite, the ascent, the Anabasis. Indeed, in one of his last works, the entrance to the Monte Sant'Angelo metro station in Naples, Italy, Anish Kapoor has designed two complementary structures: one externalized and the other gaping inwards. In his works, like Fontana's, the tear and the cut would be meaningless if they didn't expose the abyss (*abgrûnt*). Negativity entails both the reversibility and the dissimilarity of the image itself, the emergence of what medieval theologians called the *vestigium*.

From the perspective of the construction of US identity, there is an image of contemporary television fiction that clearly expresses the link between negativity, emptiness and negative forms of evil and gloom

It is significant that movements outside the "underground" belonging to other, more commercial spheres of the comic strip industry, such as the revival of superheroes since the 1980s, have engaged in similar operations in narratives with codes that are genre expressive. It is interesting to note that in the work of authors like Grant Morrison, Neil Gaiman and Dave McKean, or Frank Miller, universes of visual saturation that transcribe an obsessive depiction of evil coexist with openings into the void and empty space. These openings are associated with narrative instances of violence, sacrifice, redemption or transcendental experiences of the protagonists. This is the meaning that can be ascribed to the central empty spaces on certain pages of *Arkham Asylum* (pp. 6-7), *Violent Cases* (1987, pp. 26-27, 38-39) by Neil Gaiman and Dave McKean or *Ronin* (vol. 3; p. 24) by Frank Miller.

In light of such operations and of the above exploration of *Here* and *Twin Peaks*, it would seem appropriate to define the space representative of evil not as a violent release of passions but precisely as a consequence of its opposite: a-pathy, the absence of *pathos* and passion. "When humans are not moved by passion, which launches them into action, they fold in on themselves, and depraved feelings are born," suggests Kierkegaard (Marina, 2011, p. 57). *Twin Peaks*, which plays with the narrative baggage of the first two seasons, uses negativity to establish a productive link between the "void of escape", on the one hand, and a set of forms of evil arising from the a-pathy or stagnation of eccentric characters, some of whom are clearly inspired by icons created by authors like Chester Gould in *Dick Tracy*. Here, which does not address evil but does take on Heidegger's idea of negativity, bases its journey on a succession of layers of time in an exploration dependent on a lack of *pathos*.

A desperate vindication of passion made through the topology of silence, of subtractive forms

From the perspective of the construction of US identity, there is an image of contemporary television fiction that clearly expresses the link between negativity, emptiness and negative forms of evil and gloom: the final scene showing Don Draper (Jon Hamm), the protagonist in the series *Mad Men*, doing yoga in the final episode ("Waterloo", 7.7), which is followed by the Coca-Cola "Hilltop" ad (1971), the perfect definition of positivity in the performance society. It could be viewed as a response to the carousel of family images in Here, the empty glass cube in Twin Peaks or the poetics of Chris Ware. "It's the Real Thing" sings a group of young people of different ethnic backgrounds on a hilltop; different, close, but able in their convergence to flatten, in an unsettling manner, any difference between them. Compared to the "can-do" attitude based on the negation of difference and individual *pathos* that the character Don Draper repress during the series *Mad Men*, the negative approach, like the mystic dimension in the case of the apophatic aesthetic, is precisely the opposite: a desperate vindication of passion made through the topology of silence, of subtractive forms.

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Preventive Measures of Violent Radicalization That Leads to Violence and Terrorism and the Need for its Effective Implementation

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to explore the current measures related to the prevention of violent radicalization that leads to violence and terrorism, exploring the different dimensions of the phenomenon of radicalization and extremism, which cannot be applied to certain stigmatized communities but to a wider spectrum of different political violent ideologies. At this point the proper use of terminology in this field can help us to understand how to address this challenge as a whole. Countries such as the USA and different International Organizations have carried out a set of measures to prevent violent radicalization but not always in a successful or effective way, although many initiatives at a local level are showing promising results. There is still a lot of work to be done not only in the field of prevention, but also in the de-radicalization one, measures should be more efficient.

1. UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERMINOLOGY

The knowledge of the terminology related to terms such as extremism, radicalization, violent radicalization or terrorism is fundamental in discerning one term from the other; each term has a different definition. Knowing this fact, the adoption of radical ideas does not imply direct violence. Even violent extremism does not have direct correlation to terrorism.

Marc Sageman (2017) mentions that:

> The process of turning to political violence is commonly called *radicalization*. However, this term has a double meaning: it refers both to the acquisition of extreme or radical ideas and to the readiness to use violence. The two are not the same. Many people share radical ideas, but the vast majority do not go on to use violence in their pursuit. The literature unfortunately confuses these two very separate processes and assumes that belief in racial ideas inevitably leads to violence. (p. 9)

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On the other hand, terms like extremism has been described by authors like Shmidt (2013) affirming that:

> In terms of historical precedents (e.g. Fascism, Communism), extremists can be characterized as political actors who tend to disregard the rule of law and reject pluralism in society [...] Extremists strive to create a homogeneous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; they seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities. That distinguishes them from mere radicals who accept diversity and believe in the power of reason rather than dogma. [...]Extremists on the political left and right and those of a religious-fundamentalist orientation as well as those of an ethno-nationalist political hue tend, in their struggle to gain, maintain or defend state power, to show a propensity to prefer, on their paths to realize their political programs: Use of force/violence over persuasion; Uniformity over diversity; Collective goals over individual freedom; Giving orders over dialogue. (p. 8-9)

Other authors like Aron Kundnani (2015) comments that "It is worth noting that the term "extremism" has long been used as a way of denouncing political dissent."

Even violent extremism does not have direct correlation to terrorism

Terms like terrorism are explained by the EUROPOL in the TESAT report 2018 as such:

> The definition of the term 'terrorist offences' is indicated in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), which all EU Member States have implemented in their national legislation. This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization when committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing an act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization. (p. 63)

There are many definitions of terrorism but there is no definition that is widely accepted. The same happens with term such as extremism and radicalization. The Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence of Canada describes radicalization leading to violence as "a process whereby people adopt an extremist belief system – including the intent to use, encourage or facilitate violence – in order to promote an ideology, a political project or a cause as a means of social transformation" (Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2016 in YOUTH WORK AGAINST VIOLENT RADICALISATION Theory, concepts and primary prevention in practice, 2018, p. 15).

Schmid (2013) differentiate between radicalism and extremism saying that "In the past, radicalism has reformed our political systems, allowing fringe movements to become mainstream movements" (p.55), the author is stating that even if radicals share characteristics with extremists there are differences such as the willingness to engage in critical thinking.

Berger (2018) explains about radicalization that leads to extremism that "the escalation of an in-group's extremist orientation in the form of increasingly negative views about an out-group or the endorsement of increasingly hostile or violent actions against an out-group" (p. 172). It is very important to differentiate and understand all these terms so we can take it into account once we start designing policies and putting in place measures for the prevention of violent radicalization.

Understanding the factors that can lead a priori to a process of radicalization or to a process of violent radicalization constitute an important tool in order to carry into effect the policies to prevent such procedures. Analyzing the context of the radicalized person and other crucial elements like his/her personality is extremely important too. Oliver Roy (2017) talks about the islamization of radicalism explaining that many youngsters in France related to terrorism had small curricula of petit crimes (p.17). From Roy´s ideas we can conclude that people don´t have to get violent because they adhere to a concrete religious ideology, separating terror from religion; although it could indicate that once someone commits a violent act the following one would become much easier and can indicate also that the commission of a violent act can also

be influenced by individual´s social, political, religious and economic context…which excludes also the theory of violent predisposition[1].

Diego Muro (2016) explains that "Radicalization towards violent extremism is a complex and multifaceted process that takes place at a variety of levels (individual, organizational and systemic)" (p. 2). From most of the explanation surrounding the studies related to the field of radicalization, like Moghaddam's model of six steps that illustrates the process of radicalization (2005), Sagema´s (2017) explanation of self-categorization as "the core concept of a social science project analyzing the behavior of groups, known as the social identity perspective (SIP)" (p. 6) is the approach that entails a more complete sense from our point of view. The author mentions the works of other scholars like Tafjel "group bias involved identification with one´s group" and his student John Turner noted that "these minimal group conditions showed that loners spontaneously

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acted out on behalf of a group with which they had no contact" (p. 6). Berger (2018) also mentions The **Social identity theory as pioneered by social pshycologists Henri Tafjel and John C.Turner, this theory stipulates that people categorize themselves and others as members of competing social group (p.24), the in-group vs out-group explained above.**

This reflection seems more adequate to the current events, I mentioned in other publications (Jalloul, 2018) that if we circumscribe our analysis to the European Muslim citizens that became radicalized and committed terrorist acts, we must not ignore the fact that they are European Muslim citizens. That is to say that those individuals who are radicalized toward violence and execute it along with terrorist groups, advocate a cause that geographically and, in some cases culturally, is alien to them. We can mention the circumstance of those individuals, having or not Arabic origins, who have never been in the Arab world in countries like Syria or Iraq, in which organizations like ISIS raised the capitals of their Caliphate. They identify themselves with causes that are not theirs, there is a misconception of the belonging identity.

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[1] Sageman (2017a) explains that "this common cognitive bias neglecting contextual factors and reducing actors to stereotypes, driven by simple internal factors such as personality or ideology [...] two common explanations from this perspective are that terrorist are either criminals or mentally ill". (pp. 92-93)

2. THE CATEGORIZATION OF TERRORIST OFENDERS

When we talk about terrorism, we need to realize that terrorism as a consequence of a violent political action can be committed by groups with different political and religious ideologies, even carried out by political actors. We tend to think that terrorism only applies to individuals from specific religious communities, an example of this is when an individual of Muslim confession commits a terrorist act. On the other side, when the press publishes about other terrorists' attacks committed by non-Muslim individuals, they are not labeled, in many cases, as terrorist.

Citing examples, we can mention the 2016 terrorist attack on a Berlin Christmas market. Terrorist group known as Islamic State claimed responsibility for the horrific attack which killed

We should not forget that not only individuals but also political actors can radicalize toward violence

12 and left up to 50 injured. If we considered Sageman´s definition on terrorism "as a public´s categorization of political violence by non-state actors during domestic peacetime" (p. 91), we can evidently agree that the German market attack was carried out by a terrorist. The same definition can be used when in the US, last year´s mass shooting took place in Las Vegas, a gunman opened fire in a concert killing 58 people leaving 851 injured, resulting one of the deadliest mass shooting in recent US history, in this case the perpetrator was described as a 64-year-old gambler and former accountant (BBC, 2017) or as a gunman, in the case where 12 people were killed in a shooting the 8th of November at a bar in California. (New York Times, 2018). Although both cases confirm every pattern related to the several definitions known of terrorism.

Currently, the US is witnessing a huge growth of extreme right movements. In fact, as the Washington post published recently (Barret, Zapotosky, Stead Sellers, 2018), after the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting on the 27 of October that left 11 people dead, calls for the federal government to update its laws to put the kind of violence targeting minorities, religious groups and the public in the same category as terrorists inspired by overseas groups. The same article mentions that "A 2017 report by the Government Accountability Office found that since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, far-right violent extremists were responsible for 106 killings in the United States, while Islamist-inspired violent extremists had killed 119. The GAO found that while the number of deaths were roughly similar, the number of incidents were not; far-right extremists committed almost three times as many attacks − 62, compared with 23 by Islamist extremists."

There is an acceptance of a certain type of violence used by political actors, like states, who are radicalized in their fight against those non-state actors whom they categorize as terrorists. This reality offers a dimension of conflict less clear, also compels us to think of the "other" as the "real terrorist"

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), according to a document of the European Commission (2015) could be defined as: "The fight against violent extremism, or CVE, constitutes all actions that strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities to the appeal of radicalizers and extremism"

Other articles, (The Conversation, 2018), state that from 1990 to the present, far-right extremists have committed 217 ideologically-motivated homicides. 19 of these homicides targeted religious institutions or individuals thought to be associated with a particular religion. Eleven were motivated by anti-Semitism, specifically.

Europe witnessed one of its deadliest terrorist attacks in the Norwegian Island of Utoya in 2011 perpetrated by a far-right extremist, Anders Behring, Breivik who killed 69 young people.

The council of Europe released a report last April 2018 (p. 16), based on the report by the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, in which several forms and manifestations of radicalization leading to violence are described. We find right-wing extremist violence, left-wing extremist violence, politico-religious extremist violence and single-issue extremist violence. In all the mentioned cases the range of violent actions can vary from verbal violence to terrorist attacks, damage to public goods, physical aggression or murders, amongst others.

On the other hand we should not forget that not only individuals but also political actors can radicalize toward violence. There is an acceptance of a certain type of violence used by political actors, like states, who are radicalized in their fight against those non-state actors whom they categorize as terrorists. This reality offers a dimension of conflict less clear, also compels us to think of the "other" as the "real terrorist", Jalloul (2018). Examples can be Guantanamo, the persecution, torture and murder of the Rohingya minority by Myanmar's security forces and other religious groups. Civilians killed in Syria by Russian bombings and the US-led military coalition against Daesh. Civilian's death toll by the NATO air campaign in Libya in 2011, among others.

We cannot misjudge the fatal consequences of the jihadist terrorism in our society that tried over and over to undermine our democratic values, but also we cannot forget that in the field of prevention of radicalization that leads to violence and to terrorism, as its ultimate consequence, other types of terrorism are as dangerous as the jihadist's type. As we said before, terrorism has several manifestations and the religious one is just one of them. **The field of prevention of radicalization should take all of them into account in order to make our societies more resilient to the radicalizator's discourses and ideology.**

3. PREVENTIVE STRATEGIES TO FIGHT VIOLENT RADICALISATION THAT LEADS TO VIOLENCE

Different policies have been put in place for the fight against violent radicalization, they are known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), according to a document of the European Commission (2015) could be defined as: "The fight against violent extremism, or CVE, constitutes all actions that strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities to the appeal of radicalizers and extremism" (p. 9). Its objectives are to prevent radicalization and also to achieve the de-radicalization of some individuals, before the latter could travel to fight with terrorist groups such as ISIS; or once they return after fighting with them. These programs have not always been effective as intended, it is worth mentioning that within these programs there are online counter narratives programs (counternarratives). Different institutions at European level, as well

as different civil organizations and different projects and institutions financed by the EU, have launched several projects and research groups related to the prevention of radicalization[2]. In 2016 the European Commission presented a communication for the prevention of violent extremism[3].

The Council of Europe approved last July a Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2018-2022) based mainly on prevention, prosecution and protection, including assistance to victims (Council of Europe, 2018). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe launched in 2015 the initiative #NoHateNoFear, calling on politicians "to shoulder their responsibility to speak out publicly against fear and hatred, and to promote fundamental freedoms and the values of tolerance, non-discrimination and respect for human dignity. Through practical action in their parliaments and in their constituencies, parliamentarians can help immunize society against fear and hatred." The United Nations also launched an action plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalism at the end of 2015. The projects have been carried out by organizations, even by the States. The fight against violent extremism (CVE) is also known as prevention of violent extremism (PVE-Preventing Violent Extremism) term coined by the United Nations, although in reality both are largely identical; In recent years they have been presented as alternatives to reduce the risks derived from radicalization processes toward violence and the commission of terrorist acts. The OSCE refers to the fight against violent extremism as "the fight against violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism", or VERLT - another term that is, again, largely similar to that of the CVE (Neuman, 2017, p. 19).

The European Union promotes initiatives through institutions such as RAN (Radicalization Awareness Network) funded by the European Commission, which brings together European experts to work on the prevention of radicalization; or with projects of the European Union such as CT MORSE, which provides policy monitoring and support for the actions of The European Union Instrument for Stability and Peace (IcSP), in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in third countries.

Among many other projects pertaining to the prevention of radicalization we find *The Counter-Islamophobia kit*, funded by the European Commission-Directorate of Justice, which brings

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[2] For example, *Quilliam Foundation, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Fida Management, RUSI,* global network Against Violent extremism (AVE) formed by individuals who had been violent extremists, as well as by survivors of violent extremism, in the UK. British government also finance projects such as *Imams Online*; *RAN y CTMORSE* by the European Union, *Counter Extremism Project, Impact Europe, ICCT,* there is also a program form OSCE; in France the government supported the initiative *Stop d´jihadisme*. In Spain *Plan Estratégico Nacional de lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta,* a program to stop radicalization in prisons, both of the since 2015, and the platform STOP-radicalismos; nor very successful. While the the *Plan Transversal por la Convivencia y la Prevención de la Radicalización Violenta* in the city of Málaga has been successful. In the Middle East there are organizations like *Sawab Center o Hedayah Countering Violent Extremism Center* in Abu-Dhabi

[3] COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism Brussels, 14.6.2016 COM (2016) 379 final. There other documents: Commission Communication on Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response, COM (2013) 941 final of 15 January 2014, European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2015 on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations (2015/2063(INI)),

In the United States the first national strategy to prevent violent extremism was launched in 2011 under Obama´s presidency, this is known as *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*

In early 2017 the Trump´s administration announced the name change for Counter Islamic Extremism, which was widely criticized for being ineffective and for attacking Muslim communities

experts from across Europe. The objective of this project is to critically review dominant anti-Muslim narratives, comparing the use and efficacy of prevailing counter-narratives to Islamophobia in eight European Union Member States

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Other authors have criticized the orientation that CVE Programs took with Trump's administration, where it seems that securitization weights more than policies that focus on prevention; mentioning also that (Stewart, 2017) "despite a wealth of data available to create an evidence-based policy, an American CVE policy grounded in scientific support has not yet been produced. Until these concerns are adequately addressed, CVE efforts in the United States remain in a state of disarray and uncertainty" (p. 45-46). These remarks stress the deficiency of this type of programs in the US.

In fact, having a look into the web page of the U.S. Department of State, The Global Counter Terrorism Forum specifies that "It provides a unique platform for senior counterterrorism policymakers and experts from around the world to work together to identify urgent needs, devise solutions and mobilize resources for addressing key counterterrorism challenges. With its primary focus on capacity building and countering violent extremism"; we cannot find the word *preventing*, although we know that the term used, CVE, has at one of its most important goals the prevention of radicalization that leads to violence. In the special briefing by Nathan A. Sales, coordinator for Counterterrorism on the Release of the Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, also at the U.S. Department of State's webpage, he states that:

> The report notes a number of major strides that the United States and our international partners made to defeat and degrade terrorist organizations in 2017. We worked with allies and partners around the world to expand information sharing, improve aviation security, enhance law enforcement and rule of law capacities, and to counter terrorist radicalization with a focus on preventing recruitment and recidivism.

We observe clearly that the US policy related to CVE is focused on the terrain of securitization more than in the prevention or de-radicalization.

If we study the efforts done with *de-radicalization* the perspective changes, taking into consideration that it is a step that must be taken when someone has been already radicalized: this

person even if radicalized does not have to manifest any sort of violence, or he can be a radical ready to administer any type of violence, in a nearby geography or in the battlefield of places like Syria or Iraq, or he can be a freedom fighter whose returning from fighting with a terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda or ISIS in the battlefield. Or a person that is in jail in a place like Iraq or Syria. Omar Ashour (2009) comments that:

> De-radicalization is another process of relative change within Islamist movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and de-legitimizes the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving towards an acceptance of gradual social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context. A group undergoing a de-radicalization process does not have to ideologically abide by democratic principles, whether electoral or liberal, and does not have to participate in an electoral process. De-radicalization is primarily concerned with changing the attitudes of armed Islamist movements toward violence, rather than toward democracy. Many de-radicalized groups still uphold misogynist, homophobic, xenophobic and anti-democratic views (P.5).

De-radicalization is now of utmost concern, especially once the caliphate of ISIS has fallen, in Syria and Iraq respectively. The main concern is focusing on those Europeans who have been fighting with radical Islamist jihadist militias in Syria, from *Fatah al-sham*, to ISIS and other factions in Syrian territory; we shouldn't forget to add the hundreds of Europeans who joined militias not considered jihadists like the Kurds. According to an Egmont report, about 500 combatants have returned to the European Union (Renard and Coolsaet, 2018). With these foreign fighters returning to their European countries, it is crucial to socialize them and integrate them into society, which is a laborious task, taking into consideration the different criteria of each case individually. That depends on the individuals, families, ages, process of recruitment and action on the battlefield, as well as the rank within the terrorist organization. The process of socialization of children, who have been born or raised in these group's territories, must be analyzed carefully and case by case. Many of them were not radicalized despite having socialized in the environment. On the other hand, there are adolescents who have participated in violent actions, and have been subjected to instructions and indoctrination. We must consider if those who returned wish to enroll in the de-radicalization process or program, or if the individual returned for economic or family reasons, because they were disappointed in what they have found within these groups, etc. We need to know how these people can reintegrate into society after spending time in such a hostile environment. In the European Union there is a determined framework of action for freedom fighters in each member state (European Parliament, 2017). There is also a common framework for action at EU level (European Parliament, 2016). It is not yet known how many combatants of terrorist's groups, such as ISIS, are still alive, have died, have joined other jihadist organizations or have been captured (Jalloul, 2018).

Not every freedom fighter is returning to his country of origin, hundreds are kept in Syrian and Iraqi's jails since their countries, not all, are reluctant to judge them in their home courts.

The US policy related to CVE is focused on the terrain of securitization more than in the prevention or de-radicalization

France has many nationals in jail controlled by the Kurds in Syria, at this stage the country prefers that inmates would be judged case by case there, not in France (El País, 2018). Human Rights Watch (2017) raised several concerns about due process in the screening process for people leaving ISIS-controlled areas, including vetting procedures for lists of suspects compiled by local security forces. Those wrongfully identified as suspects may spend months in arbitrary detention. The organization also gave numbers of those who were sentenced to death and executed. If we want our democratic system to remain impartial, we need to guarantee detainees' fair trial, which by itself is a way of allowing them to be conscious of their mistakes, and it can work as a measure of de-radicalization.

> A report of ICSR (2018) this year indicates that. Recorded up to 7,366 persons have now returned to their home countries (20%), or appear to be in repatriation processes to do so. Only 256 (4%) of total returnees are recorded as women, accounting for up to 5% of the women who travelled to Syria and Iraq. Up to 1,180 (17%) of total returnees are recorded as minors, accounting for up to 25% of minors who travelled to, or were born in, Iraq and Syria. South-Eastern Asia saw the highest proportion of female and minor returnees at up to 59%, followed by Western Europe (55%); Central Asia (48%); Sub-Saharan Africa (33%); Eastern Europe (18%); Americas, Australia New Zealand (8%); Southern Asia (<1%); and MENA (<1%). There were no returnees accounted for in Eastern Asia. Significant discrepancies in accounting for foreign citizens in Iraq and Syria – including those described above – rarely distinguish between men and women, adults and minors, making is particularly problematic to fully assess the current status of these distinct populations. Women and minors must be considered as distinct and complex categories, each with varying levels of agency. Do not reference them in singular categories ('women and children,' families,' and so forth). Minors in particular require nuanced consideration. Delineate all data of persons affiliated with terror and extremist groups by age and gender. (pp.3-5)

4. CONCLUSIONS

Drawing conclusions, we can say that the use of terminology is basic when we speak about prevention of radicalization that leads to violence, we cannot infer that a process of radicalization can lead to violence or terrorism, since not all violence implies terrorism, although every terrorist action implies violence; therefore, prevention in an early stage could prevent radicalization and violent radicalization.

Associating processes of radicalization with security measures or linking them to specific communities' conduct lead us to some sort of confusion that does not address the approach that must be taken if we want to fight against radicalization with preventive measures. Not every process of radicalization must be associated with terrorism, as we just commented, and neither associated with Muslim communities, stigmatization is the only result if we don't analyze such processes on

an individual level since each one can be subject to any type of radicalization. We need to reject the idea that there is a direct connection between processes of radicalization and religious ideology. That would imply that violence is inherent to any religious belief and that would mean that any person that embraces religion such as Islam can become a terrorist. It is a fact though that a biased interpretation of the religious texts, if we talk here specifically about islamist violent-terrorist radicalization, and the efficiency of the religious discourses based on that interpretation has an important weight in the process of an individual's radicalization, but radicalization per se depends on the person's personality, his surroundings, his self-identification within a group. There are no general profiles for radical individuals, which depends on many factors.

We are experiencing the growth of far-right extremist groups, Sahar (2017) mentions that "From 2000 to 2015, the number of hate groups has -increased by 56%, which include a large number of anti-immigrants, anti-LGBT, anti-Muslim, and antigovernment "Patriot" groups. And from 2014 to 2015 the number of radical right-wing groups increased by 14%". He also makes allusions about the increase of white supremacist and White Nationalist online forums asserting that:

> And yet we are not seeing government CVE programs targeting single white males in their thirties and forties who are the most common demographic committing mass murder. 127 Nor are we seeing CVE programs for Christians due to right wing groups' misappropriation of Christian doctrine in furtherance of their violent political ends. Government hearings are not being held to debate whether violence perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan, the Army of God, or the Lord's Resistance Army should be called "radical Christian terrorism". (p. 274)

Another remarkable thing is that, as John Horgan noted (Schmidt, 2013):

> Not every terrorist holds radical views. It is also important to distinguish between terrorism as a political doctrine and terrorism as an act of political violence. Terrorist political crimes are in a way remarkably similar to war crimes as both involve, at their core, deliberate attacks on civilians and/or the taking of hostages. (p. 23)

The main thing we should think about is why there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, as Sageman (2017a) asserts: "there is no consensus because different definers have different groups and different research question in mind" (p. 11). The term has been politicized many times, the same is happening with the term radicalization. Political and nonpolitical actors can be subject to a process of radicalization, some political actors exercise violence at the expense of our liberties, we need to be careful and apply our critical thinking about conflicts in our home and foreign countries. The war in Iraq, Syria or Libya has not made our planet more secure, at the contrary, it has contributed to the increase of frustration and violence.

We need to ask ourselves why nationalist-populist movements and discourses, like in Europe or the US, are growing profiting from the identity and economic crisis, and praising in their

speeches the importance of national borders while displaced populations are dying in its way to a "fortress Europe" and to a US "only for Americans".

It's important to remember that white supremacist terrorism and jihadi terrorism are undergoing a process of *reciprocal radicalization*, in which both become more extreme in response to each other's activity. The process of radicalization in both terrorist ideologies are very similar, on-line and off-line radicalization, activism, recruitment, the relevance of the leader, the use of important historical events in their narratives, propaganda through the web, etc

Other concepts such as "radical" (Schmid, 2013) "has changed quite dramatically in little more than a century: while in the 19th century, 'radical' referred primarily to liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, progressive political positions, contemporary use – as in 'radical Islamism' – tends to point in the opposite direction: embracing an anti-liberal, fundamentalist, anti-democratic and regressive agenda" (p. 7). That indicates that we use this kind of terms depend on the subjectivity of the interlocutor.

We need to use our terms very carefully because any misuse can lead to a confusion. We are in need to strengthen our societies to the call of radicalizers. Empowering our young people, investing in their resilience to violent ideologies. One of the best measures is fostering their critical thinking with an accurate use of the terminology related to radicalization that leads to violence.

Organizations such as the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization leading to violence has been working in prevention activities giving proper tools to actors affected by radicalization leading to violence. For example: public awareness workshops for young people, Public awareness workshops for parents, Community development and awareness activities and Development of prevention strategies to meet the needs of individual groups, communities or organizations, they have also training programs. They work also with women and violent radicalization and returnees. They invest also in providing support and psychosocial counselling for individuals who are radicalized or becoming radicalized (CPRLV, 2018). Many specific recommendations have been published in a document by the High-level Commission Expert Group on Radicalization (HLCEG-R), radicalization implies a multi-dimensional challenge that require multifaceted response. (HLCEG-R, 2018).

Something noteworthy is that CPRLV talks about disengagement and social reintegration more that de-radicalization. As explained before, an individual can be de-radicalized from the mindset related to the use of armed violence, but it does not imply that they give up radical views or attitudes.

Another important aspect to deal with radicalization is the need to separate securitization processes form the prevention of radicalization, we are not fighting at first stages against terrorism, we are fighting against radicalization processes that lead to violence or terrorism through prevention.

Many measures should be implemented in an effective way if we want to succeed in preventing radicalization that leads to violence. Education is crucial, educators should be

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teaching terminology in the first place, preventive measures, working in group, detecting students' frustrations, bullying etc. several projects in Germany, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other European countries have put in place empowering youth fighting radicalization. (YOUTH WORK AGAINST VIOLENT RADICALISATION) Theory, concepts and primary prevention in practice, p. 32-68). Talking with the families of radicalized individuals is important, trying to understand the pain that violence inflict in their lives, to the radicalized person and for everything surrounding it at physical, emotional, social, religious and intellectual level.

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fomenting interculturality, involve students' families, working at community-local and municipal level, promote the role of women in the prevention of extremism, control radical speeches and collaborating in projects with mosques, preventing radicalization in prisons with specific programs. Advice through campaigns of the danger of the false online profiles and chats of extreme right, left and religious individuals and organizations. Work in the deconstruction of islamist radical discourses through Islamic law. Keep working on counter-narratives through the internet and in educational centers (Jalloul, 2017).

Putting in force a proper guideline for the prevention of radicalization that leads to violence within governments' policies would mean that we understand the needs of our societies in a successful way, that we fight against violent extremism and terrorism, that we simply fight against the fear of the unknown.

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Strategic Stability and Great-Power Rivalry in U.S.-Russia Security Relations

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Strategic Stability and Great-Power Rivalry in U.S.-Russia Security Relations

ABSTRACT

This article examines the sources of continuing competition between the U.S. and Russia during the Trump Administration, on two different dimensions. First, at a structural or systemic level of analysis, we identify the main trends in the evolution of the post-Cold War international system, where the relative decline of the U.S. prepared the ground for a new era of great-power rivalry. Secondly, we look at Russian perceptions of the U.S. strategy and how images of the Western "Other" are still derived, to a great extent, from previous experiences of confrontation. In the third section, we present the uncertain future of nuclear disarmament as an example of how this climate of bilateral competition is affecting negotiations on the highly sensitive issue of strategic stability. The fourth section deals with the controversy over how much this confrontation resembles the Cold War, as well as the inaccuracies of the concept of "hybrid war" to describe the Russian strategy toward the West. Finally, our conclusions will try to assess the prospects for U.S.-Russia cooperation in an international and domestic environment that does not seem favorable for reaching constructive agreements.

1. INTRODUCTION

With the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States, rumors of a possible rapprochement—or even alliance—with Russia became widespread in domestic and international media. His offhand remarks during the election campaign seemed to indicate a lower commitment to multilateral defense organizations like NATO, as well as some personal admiration for Vladimir Putin's "strong leadership".

According to the new president, it was the Obama Administration—not the Kremlin—that was fully to blame for the current state of bilateral relations; however, all those past disagreements would be quickly resolved once he had a chance to establish a working relationship with his Russian counterpart.

Despite this initial optimism, the reality of U.S.-Russia cooperation since Trump took office has not shown any concrete achievements, while the climate of mutual distrust is still apparent. Both leaders have held much-publicized summit meetings that have produced few tangible results, apart from new opportunities for Trump's critics to renew their accusations of a secret "collusion" with Moscow to discredit Hillary Clinton. Although there was a visible relief among Russia's leaders when Clinton finally lost the election, the truth is that having Trump in the White House has not advanced the Kremlin's national interests in any meaningful way; unless, of course, those interests were limited to "wreaking havoc" and weakening NATO's internal cohesion, accelerating the end of the U.S. primacy as leader of a liberal, rules-based international order.

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Some of the Trump Administration's policies have, in fact, openly contradicted or ignored the Russian position on certain international issues that are of the utmost importance for Moscow: economic sanctions have been renewed, the annexation of Crimea is still considered to be illegal, and the U.S. has agreed to provide Ukraine with weapons for their war against Russia-backed separatist forces in the Donbass. This has caused the Kremlin to remain extremely wary of Washington's intentions, which are now much more contradictory and unpredictable than in the past. The logic of rivalry, not mutual trust or cooperation, is still clearly predominant in their bilateral relations.

This article examines the sources of this continuing competition between the U.S. and Russia during the Trump Administration, on two different dimensions. First, at a structural or systemic level of analysis, we identify the main trends in the evolution of the post-Cold War international system, where the relative decline of the U.S.—both in terms of material capabilities and social standing—prepared the ground for a new era of great-power rivalry. Secondly, we look at Russian perceptions of the U.S. strategy and how images of the Western "Other" are still derived,

Moscow's role in this Sino-American competition would be comparatively small: unable to aim for global dominance, it would either become a "junior partner" in China's anti-Western bloc or adopt a more neutral position, limited to preserving its own regional influence in the post-Soviet space

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2. U.S. HEGEMONY IN A CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

While there is a widespread consensus that the international system can no longer be fully described in terms of American unipolarity—as in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, when the U.S. enjoyed an undisputed global primacy—, this new environment has proven much more difficult to define.

Some experts, notably Mearsheimer (2004), have argued that China's rise as a "peer competitor" of the U.S. represents the gravest danger to the latter's global hegemony, which will ultimately lead to an open confrontation in which Washington will try at all costs to prevent Beijing from becoming a superpower. According to Allison (2017) and his well-known metaphor of the "Thucydides trap", history shows that war is the most likely outcome when a rising power challenges an established hegemon, as is the case with the U.S. and China today. All these authors—in the tradition of political realism—tend to emphasize material or "hard" power resources, especially military and economic capabilities, as a way to measure relative strength. Therefore, we would be entering a hegemonic transition that could see the U.S. lose its current status as the world's only superpower, being replaced by China; or, alternatively, a new bipolar equilibrium in which Beijing would force Washington to share its global leadership with them. In any case, Moscow's role in this Sino-American competition would be comparatively small: unable to aim for global dominance, it would either become a "junior partner" in China's anti-Western bloc or adopt a more neutral position, limited to preserving its own regional influence in the post-Soviet space.

Russia and China, on the other hand, have promoted the view of a multipolar world in which neither of them would aspire to become a superpower, but try to balance U.S. hegemony by consolidating themselves—individually and jointly with the other BRICS members—as an alternative to Western-led alliances and institutions. While this multipolarity is not yet a reality in the military domain, where the U.S. remains clearly superior to any of its possible competitors, it is already present in the world economy (Nye, 2010), in which China, Japan or the EU should be regarded as centers of power in their own respect. This multipolar world would not necessarily lead to global conflict between Russia and the U.S. if Moscow's ambitions were limited to adopting a more relevant international role. On the other hand, if Moscow tried and managed to reestablish itself as a regional hegemon in Eurasia—countering the growing influence of the U.S., the EU, and NATO in the former Soviet Union—, it would effectively become a peer competitor for Washington; which now enjoys the privilege of being the only regional hegemon in the world, due to its *de*

facto control of the Western hemisphere. In that case, a resurgent Russia would be perceived as a direct threat for U.S. primacy even if it were unable−or unwilling− to return to a global bipolar confrontation.

However, all these possible scenarios are based on historical analogies that do not capture the profound changes in the nature of power in a globalized world, as well as the underlying causes of the perceived U.S. decline *vis-à-vis* its competitors. The increasing diffusion and fragmentation of global power into multiple actors−not just states, but also corporations, transnational networks, and other non-governmental entities−has been described as "age of nonpolarity" (Haass, 2008), in which major powers are not able to exercise their influence as much as they did in the past, and also−being economically interdependent−are less inclined to engage in regional or global competition.

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This view is supported by Buzan (2004), who argues that the idea of polarity is not just connected to a state's material capabilities, but also to its social relations with others: in the near future, it is unlikely that China, Russia, or any other possible competitors will acquire a social standing comparable to the extensive network of U.S. allies and partners around the world, as well as the influence of American "soft power". In parallel, Washington would tend to disengage from other continents and focus on its own domestic problems, renouncing its own superpower status and allowing regional powers to consolidate themselves in different parts of the world. As a result, conflicts over global hegemony would be replaced by rivalries between countries in the same geographical area, competing for regional leadership and−eventually−great power status.

In some respects, the Trump Administration's rhetoric seems to be walking the path toward "a world with no superpowers": for example, by questioning long-standing commitments to defending its European allies, or damaging its own reputation as a "liberal hegemon" aimed at spreading democratic values. On the other hand, in spite of Trump's previous criticism of U.S. interventions, Washington does not seem to be withdrawing or disengaging from other regions: rather, its confrontational posture toward Iran, North Korea, Cuba, or Venezuela−reminiscent of the Bush Administration's "axis of evil"−has been combined with a growing emphasis on strengthening U.S. military capabilities in the face of "revisionist" China and Russia (National Security Strategy, 2017, p. 25). This shows that the logic of interstate rivalry with Moscow and other great powers is still present in the current U.S. strategy, both at the regional and global levels.

3. RUSSIAN PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. HEGEMONY AND PROSPECTS FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION

The unipolar nature of the post-Cold War international order and the aspirations to transform it into a multilateral system, where Moscow could assert itself as an independent center of power, have received an overwhelming attention by Russian scholars, experts, and policymakers. After a brief period of "liberal Westernist" euphoria in the early years of the Yeltsin presidency, "national-statism" (*derzhavnichestvo*) emerged in the mid-1990s as the official foreign policy doctrine (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 97). This view, based on the defense of Russia's status as a great power (*derzhava*) in a multipolar world, perceived the U.S. as a unilateralist hegemon that—together with its allies—repeatedly imposed Western interests and values on all other countries, through military intervention if necessary (Primakov, 2008). Therefore, Russia's recovery from its internal crisis and consolidation as an influential international actor during the 2000s were perceived by the foreign

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policy establishment as a limited and defensive move against a revisionist/aggressive U.S., not as preparation for any future attempt at establishing global—or even regional—hegemony.

U.S. unilateralism, however, has also been used by Russian leaders to justify their increased interventionism in the post-Soviet space in the past few years; a strategy that has clearly exceeded any purely defensive purposes, with an unwarranted use of military force in the face of challenges that could have been solved by other means. Although there is a great deal of victimhood in the self-serving argument that their military interventions in Georgia or Ukraine were simply "responding" to the threat of NATO expansion, it is also true that Moscow's concerns in this regard are genuinely shared by most of its foreign policy experts and government officials. Even today, traumatic memories of their country's internal weakness and vulnerability after the Soviet collapse are still influencing their assessment of the U.S. ability to preserve a hegemonic position in world politics, which—contrary to Western perceptions of a declining, not growing, American influence—tends to be greatly exaggerated in Russia.

Recent studies of bilateral relations with Washington written by Russian scholars indicate the prevalence of a pessimistic approach to the possibilities of mutual cooperation. For example, Zhuravleva (2017) argues that both countries are still divided by their exceptionalist and messianic

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ideologies, as well as the historical construction of their respective identities in opposition to the "Other", considered an enemy. According to Shakleina (2018), Trump has largely maintained the same hegemonic foreign policies—exemplified by the slogan "America First"— as the previous administrations, including NATO's preservation as a useful instrument for U.S. leadership, despite his initial criticism of the unequal burden-sharing within the Alliance. Even from a liberal position, authors like Kurilla (2017) have complained about the continuing demonization of Russia by the American media and political class, which has caused a long-term damage to bilateral relations and resurrected some of the ghosts of the Cold War. This skepticism about the possibility of meaningful cooperation is confirmed by Bezrukov et al. (2017, p. 11), who—while being clearly sympathetic to Trump's opposition to the U.S. liberal establishment—also highlight the American president's belief in "taking a firm approach and advancing his own interests" in order to gain respect from Russia, which could lead to new tensions.

4. THE INF TREATY AS A SOURCE OF STRATEGIC (IN)STABILITY

Nuclear arms control and disarmament treaties remain one of the key areas of U.S.-Russia relations, at least from Moscow's point of view. The concept of "strategic stability"—often mentioned in the Kremlin's official statements after bilateral meetings with their American counterparts— refers to maintaining the balance of nuclear forces at a level that provides a sufficient deterrent for both sides, therefore eliminating temptations to launch a first strike. These agreements introduce an element of predictability, which contributes to avoiding misperceptions or miscalculations in case of crisis. However, Cold War understandings of strategic stability are no longer sufficient: in the present day, the U.S. and Russia should be able to jointly remove all incentives for any possible use of nuclear weapons—not only a first strike—, as well as to establish limits to other technologies that could have an equally destabilizing effect, such as space systems or conventional weapons with a destructive potential close to that of nuclear armaments (Arbatov, 2018, p. 26; Trenin, 2018). In this regard, Trump's plans to "terminate" the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty has raised concerns about hypothetical future deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, a category that had been fully eliminated as a result of that agreement; as well as about the possible extension of the New START Treaty on strategic—i.e. long-range—nuclear weapons, due to expire in 2021 (Reif, 2018; PIR Center, 2018). The U.S. decision was formally based on their accusations of a violation of the treaty by the Russian side: specifically, having tested a ground-launched cruise missile that would supposedly fall within the range forbidden by the INF. Even if those accusations were true, some experts (Podvig, 2018) have argued that the military significance of those missiles—compared to other new weapons in the Russian arsenal—would not justify abandoning a disarmament treaty that has survived for so many years after the end of the Cold War. In the current climate of mutual distrust, both sides have made few attempts to provide information about their respective arguments in a more transparent way, which could have helped them overcome this disagreement.

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although some differences remain. The Russian president has tried to present his actions—without much success—as fully compliant with international law; for example, comparing the annexation of Crimea with NATO's intervention in Kosovo, while refusing to acknowledge his covert military assistance to the rebel forces in Donetsk and Lugansk. With regard to the U.S., the appointment of John Bolton as National Security Advisor has brought back the radical rejection of international law and multilateral institutions that characterized the neoconservative ideology of the Bush Administration; even a seemingly innocuous entity, the Universal Postal Union—one of the oldest intergovernmental organizations in the world—has been abandoned by Washington. In fact, it was probably Bolton who convinced his president of pursuing a more interventionist and unilateralist foreign policy course.

5. COLD WAR, COLD PEACE... OR HYBRID WAR?

The present climate of rivalry and mutual accusations may only be categorized as a "new Cold War" in the most literary and metaphorical sense: there are too many inaccuracies in this historical analogy to make it a useful conceptualization of the current state of U.S.-Russia relations. According to Walt (2018), the main differences are three: the Cold War was only possible in a bipolar international system, in which there were two superpowers—not one, like today—that stood in rough parity compared to each other. Secondly, the Cold War was an ideological confrontation between two mutually-exclusive universalist projects; today, on the contrary, Moscow and Washington are both part of the same global capitalist system, with the former accepting the basic premises of integration into the world economy. And finally, the Cold War was a global confrontation that expanded into the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America; now, these regions are comparatively much more determined by their own internal dynamics.

However, once again Russian views are more pessimistic: although a full return to bipolar confrontation would be impossible, there are some elements of it that could reemerge in the current scenario. An example of the military-geopolitical factors that have increased their threat perceptions has been NATO's missile defense system in European soil, which Moscow considers to be oriented against Russia; this has been used by the Kremlin to justify an ambitious modernization of their armed forces, trying to reduce the gap with the U.S. technological superiority (Oznobischev, 2016). All of which does not mean that Russia is willing to—or capable of—achieving parity with American military power, engaging in a new nuclear and conventional arms race. On the contrary, Moscow's tactics are increasingly focused on exploiting its own comparative advantages and the adversary's vulnerabilities in a cost-effective way: for example, using its state-owned media to spread propaganda and disinformation, in what some Western commentators have termed a "hybrid war" strategy.

This last concept is, sadly, another example of the increasing militarization of the language used to describe relations between the West and Russia, in an attempt at connecting the Kremlin's actions with their Soviet predecessors. As Renz and Smith (2016, p. 11) have clarified, "hybrid" warfare involves the use of military and non-military means in the same operation; for example, the occupation of Crimea, which combined information and propaganda with the

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
deployment of intelligence operatives and elite troops. But these tactics cannot be understood as a Russian foreign policy doctrine, or even a national security strategy; they are just an operational approach in the framework of a military operation. In order to understand Moscow's actions in all their complexity, our analysis should encompass all of its other instruments—diplomatic, economic, cultural, and others—that do not necessarily follow a military logic.

6. CONCLUSION

From a structural realist approach to international relations, the rise of U.S.-Russian rivalry would be an unavoidable result of recent changes in the international distribution of power. The transition to a multipolar system, where China, Russia and other states have reasserted themselves as independent centers of power at the regional or global level, has produced an opposite reaction in the U.S., which feels threatened by the emergence of possible peer competitors that could challenge its own hegemonic position. On the other hand, this purely materialist understanding of power ignores the social elements that limit Moscow's future aspirations: namely, the absence of a "Russian model" that could be adopted by other societies as an alternative to Western liberalism, or Russia's clear disadvantage in terms of "soft power" on a global scale, when compared with the widespread diffusion of American culture and values.

The improvement of bilateral relations under Trump has been much more limited than initially assumed, in part because of unrealistic expectations based on the U.S. president's excessive self-confidence. The logic of competition has not completely disappeared with the arrival of a new American leader, nor is it likely to do so after Putin's eventual retirement. Both countries have global aspirations, but few common interests and values; in the security realm, their main shared priority is the fight against Daesh and other terrorist groups, which could provide the necessary incentive for establishing a closer cooperation. However, Putin has probably not forgotten his own experiences with the Bush Administration after 9/11, when Moscow's initial support for the "Global War on Terror" did not stop Washington from taking other decisions that directly challenged Russia's national interests, such as the invasion of Iraq. Any joint initiative in this regard will be cautious and limited in scope, far from a full-fledged alliance like the one between Moscow and members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Domestic factors will also continue to affect the ability of both leaders to explore other possibilities for working together. With lower ratings and continuing accusations of Russian interference in the U.S. presidential campaign, Trump will probably not want to appear too close to Putin; while Russia's president will not wish to risk his popularity in order to try a full rapprochement with Washington, after two previous disillusionments with Bush and Obama. The normalization of U.S.-Russian relations will have to be completed by their respective successors, given that the current leaders have grown too accustomed to unilaterally pursuing their own interests and regarding other world powers as competitors.

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REDEN

American Tourism to Spain during the Late Francoism: a Socio-economic Analysis

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1. INTRODUCTION

The consolidation of Spain as one of the world's top tourist destinations explains the recent academic interest on the topic under many different approaches. Thus, since the last decade, the number of researchers that study the origins and evolution of the tourism industry in the country had increased significantly (Moreno, 2007; Faraldo & Rodríguez-López, 2013; Vallejo, 2015a; Larrinaga & Vallejo, 2015). Against this backdrop, it has been mass tourism (Fernández Fuster, 1991) which has received the most attention from current Spanish historiography. It is a model whose takeoff in Spain is intimately linked to the so-called second Francoism being, in fact, one of the basis of the economic growth of the country during the sixties Pack, 2009a).

All of the works concur on the importance of mass tourism not only because of its purely economic aspect but as a crucial element for social dynamics. Sometimes the changes are simply associated with superficial issues such as new trends and fashion. A clear example in this regard may be the popularization of the bikini on the Spanish beaches during the sixties due to the arrival of French, German or Swedish tourists in search of the sun (Pavlovic, 2014). However, the mere presence of foreign visitors meant for the Spanish population an opportunity to be contact with other ways of thinking, of seeing the world, and, even more important, to interact with people who lived in democracy. In other words, there is little doubt about the active role played by tourism as a powerful channel for all kinds of cultural transfers and as an asset that contributed to shape the Spanish society during the Francoist regime (Pack, 2009b).

The dictatorship had, therefore, to reconcile their desire to make Spain a preferred tourist destination for Europeans and Americans with their doubts about the moral degradation that could involve the massive arrival of foreign travelers. Nevertheless, the new generation of politicians, who began to take governmental responsibilities after 1957's cabinet reshuffle, soon realized that tourism could end up becoming a perfect resource towards the external legitimation of the regime, just as were the measures issued to attract foreign investors. Actually, the so-called Spanish economic miracle primarily rely on the inflows of foreign currency that arrived to Spain through the expanding tourist industry, the remittances from Spanish emigrants working abroad and foreign direct investment (Balfour, 2000). We have to bear in mind that, during the sixties and until the 1973 oil crisis, the fast growth of the Spanish tourism industry was essential to correct the rising trade balance deficit of the country, as shown in the following table.

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As many of the mentioned authors have pointed out, it is necessary to go beyond a mere re-count of the foreign currencies that reached the Spanish coasts in travelers' pockets. There are other economic effects that should be addressed in order to disclose a less favorable view of the tourist boom experienced by Franco's Spain (Vallejo, 2015b). In the first place, the distortions generated in the Spanish production model must be highlighted, leading to an excessive weight of an activity that is utterly dependent on exogenous factors. No less important was, in addition, the tremendous environmental impact derived from the need to rapidly convert small villages into tourist resorts with a high level of rotation. The excesses of this construction frenzy left a perpetual imprint in several areas of the Spanish geography, propitiating long-lasting inconveniences that go from inadequate urban planning to speculative practices that soon engendered corruption scandals. One of the most famous corruption cases of this period was the Sofico Scandal, a perfect example of the illicit practices linked to real estate frenzy and multi-property. As many Americans citizens were affected by this criminal ring the U.S. Embassy in Madrid was quick to inform the State Department about the consequences derived from the suspension of payments declared by four of the eleven companies of the Sofico group and the course to be followed by the investors: "Embassy will continue follow this situation closely and report any further information. Since

TABLE 1
The Contribution of Tourism to Spain's Balance of Payments, 1959-76

YEAR	TOURISTS (in thousands)	RECEIPTS OF FOREIGN CURRENCY FROM TOURISM (in US$ millions)	BALANCE OF TRADE DEFICIT (in US$ millions)
1959	4.194	128,6	253
1960	6.113	297,0	57
1961	7.455	384,6	279
1962	8.668	512,6	634
1963	10.931	679,3	1.004
1964	14.102	918,6	1.056
1965	14.250	1.156,9	1.737
1966	17.251	1.292,5	1.964
1967	17.858	1.209,8	1.745
1968	19.183	1.212,7	1.548
1969	21.682	1.310,7	2.333
1970	24.105	1.680,8	2.360
1971	26.758	2.054,4	2.025
1972	32.506	2.486,3	2.911
1973	34.559	3.091,2	4.405
1974	30.343	3.187,9	8.340
1975	30.122	3.404,3	8.516
1976	30.014	3.083,3	8.723

Source: Harrison (1978, p. 156)

Although the number of American tourists arriving to Spain during Franco's years was always lower than the amount of travelers that entered into the country with passports from the main countries of Western Europe, U.S. citizens were one of the groups that contributed the most to the annual total figures. In fact, during the sixties the United States, in close competence with Portugal since 1964, occupied the forth place behind France, United Kingdom and West Germany in the international visitors arrival to Spain ranking

there are number of American investors in Sofico resident in Western Europe, embassy giving wide distribution to information [...]" (Department of State, 1974). At least seven more telegrams were issued during the following year on the same matter.

The picture depicted above emphasizes the need to explore the tourist activity during the Late Francoism under new approaches. For example an analysis based on the From Algeciras that night, we nationality of the tourists and the bilateral relations of the dictatorship with the respective governments would help to improve the overall image we already have about this phenomenon. In this paper we will then examine the American tourism to Spain between 1969 and 1976 taking into account official sources along with press clippings of the time. A review that shall lead to a better understanding of the topic and would allow us to think beyond the clichés that often surround the period.

> ## The beneficial effects of the currencies provided by the American tourists –within the framework of an, in other terms, unbalanced economic relation between both nations– were always mentioned by U.S. official analysts in their reports.

2. AMERICAN MASS TOURISM TO SPAIN DURING THE *DESARROLLISMO* YEARS: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

Although the number of American tourists arriving to Spain during Franco's years was always lower than the amount of travelers that entered into the country with passports from the main countries of Western Europe, U.S. citizens were one of the groups that contributed the most to the annual total figures. In fact, during the sixties the United States, in close competence with Portugal since 1964, occupied the forth place behind France, United Kingdom and West Germany in the international visitors arrival to Spain ranking (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1970).

Authors as Neal M. Rosendorf (2006) have revealed the interest shown by Franco after World War II to portray Spain as a tourist destination highly attractive to Americans, as well as Washington's actions to support the private initiative in their quest to expand its business in the Iberian country. An *avant la lettre* version of the U.S. public diplomacy that, for the Spanish case, came hand in hand with the bilateral agreements signed in Madrid in 1953. To give an example, for the years prior to the tourist boom, Sasha Pack (2009a) has documented a notable increase in American tourists, going from 31.579 travelers in 1951 to 115.778 in 1956, a circumstance that is unsurprisingly linked to the signing of those U.S.-Spain executive agreements.

If we move towards the sixties, we found that the U.S.-Spain relations produced a positive balance from the American point of view by the end of the decade:

> Spain is also important to the U.S. as an economic partner. The U.S. is the largest supplier of goods to Spain ($590 million in 1968, largely agricultural products and capital goods) and is the largest market for Spain's exports ($270 million in 1968). U.S. investments in Spain total $500 to $600 million, about 40 percent of total foreign investments in the country. These represent significant contributions to the industrial modernization of Spain. Spain attracts some 800.000 U.S. tourists annually and is considered by U.S. business to have a favorable investment climate. (Department of State, 1969)

As we mentioned before, the income derived from receptive tourism was vital for the Spanish balance of payments, a constant that is equally verified for the economic relations between Spain and the United States as shown in table 2. The beneficial effects of the currencies provided by the American tourists –within the framework of an, in other terms, unbalanced economic relation between both nations– were always mentioned by U.S. official analysts in their reports. A

The number of tourists visiting Spain now totals 18 million annually and is still growing. Receipts from tourism totaled $1.2 billion in 1968 – almost a third of Spain's total foreign exchange earnings on current account" (National Security Council, 1969).

perfect example are the materials gathered to elaborate the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 46, a document aimed to assess the future of the U.S.-Spain bilateral relation in the short, medium and long term at a time when the main obstacle was the lack of agreement for the renewal of the military bases deal. A renewal that was finally signed in August of 1970 in the form of an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation (Convenio de Amistad y Cooperación entre España y los Estados Unidos de América, 1970).

Besides the macroeconomic figures of the country, is especially revealing the positive image given about Spain's tourist potential in the paper drafted by the Interdepartamental Group for Europe of the National Security Council: "A magnificent climate, a long coastline, a rich history and proximity to industrialized Europe have now made Spain one of the major tourist countries of the world. The number of tourists visiting Spain now totals 18 million annually and is still growing. Receipts from tourism totaled $1.2 billion in 1968 – almost a third of Spain's total foreign exchange earnings on current account" (National Security Council, 1969).

It should be stressed that for the American tourist the attractiveness of Spain was not only based on the aforementioned elements, but also on the affordable prices. Thus, in an eminently tourist area like Torremolinos, a room in the Hotel Pez Espada –one of the most famous lodgings of

TABLE 2
Balance of Payments between Spain & United States, 1964-75 (in US$ Millions)

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Exports, FOB	101	122	153	207	293	299	299
Imports, FOB	324	483	561	538	545	665	823
Trade Balance	-223	-361	-408	-331	-252	-366	-473
Tourism	89	98	101	86	81	97	130
US Army	37	34	37	38	31	35	36
Other services	-16	-21	-35	-41	-39	-43	-43
Net services	110	111	103	83	73	89	123
Net Transfers	8	6	7	16	13	13	19
Current Account Balance	-105	-244	-298	-232	-166	-264	-331
Direct Investment	35	54	109	70	106	20	118
Portfolio Investment	22	18	19	18	13	3	-4
Real Estate	4	6	5	5	9	11	14
Exim Bank Loans	17	20	27	61	57	36	3
Other Long Term Capital	23	24	32	57	46	53	142
Long Term Capital	101	122	192	211	231	123	273
Balance	-4	-122	-106	-21	65	-141	-58

Source: Own elaboration from Memorandum, Spanish Balance of Payment, June 1976; S 30 Domestic Money Capital Markets, Banking, Box 2, Records Relating to Portugal, Italy and Spain (RRPIS) 1976-1981, Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs (OASIA), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary Affairs (ODASIMA). Office of Industrial Nations and Global Analyses, General Record Group 56, Records of the Department of the Treasury, 1789-1990 (RG 56), National Archives at College Park (NACP); y Memorandum, Terms of trade Between Spain and US, May 14, 1974; FT Foreign Trade -General 74, Box 15, ELF: BEA, OWEA, Records Relating to Spain, 1949-76, RG 59, NACP.
Commentary: Current Account Balance = Trade Balance + Net Services + Net Transfers; Balance; Balance

At the beginning of the seventies, the habits and products of the country were still very attractive for the thousands of American tourists who wanted to choose Spain as their holiday destination. In fact, it had become one of the few countries in Europe that continued to be cheap for Americans due the oil crisis

the town– cost 720 pesetas per night in 1970. Taking into account the exchange rate of the peseta for that year (Martín Aceña, P. & Pons, M. A., 2005), 69.61 pesetas per dollar, and that the average annual income in the United States was then 6,186.24 dollars (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2010), we find that the room had a daily cost of 10,33 dollars, a quite reasonable price for one of the most luxurious hotels on the Andalusian coast.

Curiously, the case of Torremolinos –a paradigm of the uncontrolled growth during the tourist housing construction frenzy– was mentioned in 1970 by the U.S. ambassador to Spain, Robert C. Hill, in his intervention before the Spanish-American Chamber of Commerce in New York, as an argument to exemplify to what extent the country had overcome underdevelopment by then:

> Eight months ago on the tenth of June, I arrived at the Mediterranean port of Algeciras [...]. From Algeciras that night, we drove part way to Madrid, stopping over in Torremolinos, a bustling and prosperous sea-side resort for literally tens of thousands of tourists from all over the world each year. Only fifteen years ago, Torremolinos was a sleepy fishing village, with only a small enclave for tourists. In those far-off days for Torremolinos and the rest of Spain, some 750,000 tourists visited Spain yearly. In 1969, [...] a total of 21,678,494 foreign tourists visited Spain, the highest number in Spanish History and 13% above that of 1968. (Hill, 1970)

3. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS OF SPAIN ASSOCIATED WITH THE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT

Those words of Ambassador Hill, who in another passage refers to the tourism dollars as the fuel that nourished this "industry without chimneys", are a perfect sample of the socio-economic changes associated with the massive arrival of tourists. To further explore the topic we can resort to another primary source: *The New York Times*. The newspaper paid special attention to all the events related with the Late Francoism crisis and its correspondents made an outstanding job in their attempt to provide the readers with a complete view of the internal contradictions that characterized the period (López Zapico, 2010). But even one of the world's great newspapers could not avoid that these high quality chronicles also shared space with other kind of articles where the American clichés about Spain were clearly present.

In this way, by 1973 some of the elements that Americans considered typical of the Spanish idiosyncrasy, bullfighting and sangria –which had become a fashionable drink in the United States at that time– usually appeared in the pages of *The New York Times* (Ferreth, 1973; Prial, 1973). Although these kinds of articles may be categorized as trivial, they include useful information for a better understanding of the period. For example, a journalist stated that Television, El Cordobés and tourism had changed bullfighting for good. Some Spaniards said that the invasion of foreign travelers in the bull rings had turned thereby an art into a mere tourist attraction. A sign of this decline would be the existence of an American bullfighter, Joseph Robert Stephens, a military officer stationed at the base of Rota that delighted both tourists and U.S. soldiers (Gonzalez Jr., 1973).

At the beginning of the seventies, the habits and products of the country were still very attractive for the thousands of American tourists who wanted to choose Spain as their holiday destination. In fact, it had become one of the few countries in Europe that continued to be cheap for Americans due the oil crisis (Lindsey, 1973). By August 1973, Henry Giniger –who was *The New York Times* correspondent in Madrid at that time– wrote a detailed article in which he tried to addressed the impact of tourism for the country and its hidden costs. The text began reviewing the stratospheric figures reached by the tourist phenomenon:

> By the end of this year, it is estimated, relatively cheap prices and reliable weather will have brought some 32 million foreigners to Spain, a figure close to that of the native population. Last year some 29,5 million were counted. [...] José Ramón Alonso, chairman of the National Association of Hotels and Tourist proudly announced recently that tourism had earned $20-billion in foreign currency in 20 years, covering the persistent trade deficit and paying for the import of capital equipment that has permitted rapid industrialization. «In the last few years the profit from tourism has financed the launching of Spain's development», he said. Another industry leader said proudly, "we are the economic base of Spain." (Giniger, 1973, p. 25)

But there were some clouds that never appear in the shining and triumphalist discourses of the Francoist government and the tourism sector authorities. On this sense, the ecological costs derived of the out of control constructions on the Mediterranean coast was never publicized. From the pages of *The New York Times*, Giniger (1973) denounced the speculation in tourist areas like Benidorm, which had passed in a few years of being calm seaside towns to authentic jungles of hotels and leisure resorts. The journalist reports how the mayors of the municipalities of the Costa del Sol and the Costa Brava complained bitterly of the little attention paid to speculation by the central Government. It was not a problem that only affected the natives and, in fact, foreign investors soon consider Spain as an ideal destination to do quickly profitable business based on, not very exemplary, speculative practices. What is more, these kinds of practices were encouraged, or at least tolerated, by the Spanish authorities, providing a proper framework for corruption in connection with the real estate bubble as was documented by the American newspapers:

> Mr. Peroff [a former middleman in stolen securities] has also told Senate investigators that a large amount of «hot stocks» from this country [United States] also have been used to finance the recent building construction boom in southern Spain [...] "I would say 80 per cent of the whole Costa del Sol and Majorca – in fact the whole south of Spain and the islands – were built on American stock" he said [Mr. Peroff]. (Jensen, 1973, p. 65)

Nevertheless, behind those kind of complaints there was not just an ecological or environmental concern, but also certain feelings linked to the distrust of foreigners expressed by many Spaniards. A xenophobic approach that we can't ascribe to the editorial board of the Times, which seemed fully aware of the problems that came with the construction frenzy. This is evident in the fierce criticism contained in an editorial entitled "Costa Concreto" (1973), where they point out the irony that involves for a dictatorial government such as the Franco regime, which was not permissive

From the pages of The New York Times, Giniger (1973) denounced the speculation in tourist areas like Benidorm, which had passed in a few years of being calm seaside towns to authentic jungles of hotels and leisure resorts. The journalist reports how the mayors of the municipalities of the Costa del Sol and the Costa Brava complained bitterly of the little attention paid to speculation by the central Government

Flora Lewis, excellent columnist and expert in international politics, moved to Marbella at the beginning of 1976 to personally collect the opinion of the wealthy inhabitants of this gentle tourist town. They conveyed calm to the journalist, reassuring that after the death of Franco things would more or less remain the same

in almost anything, to be so permissive in these matters. The complaints did not stop during the following years and, in 1975, we may found new critics to the excessive price that the Spanish coast was paying for its adaptation to the requests of the powerful tourist industry. On this occasion, the complaint referred to the inconveniences generated as a result of the construction of a toll road in the Alicante area (Welles, 1975).

4. CONCLUSIONS: THE LASTING IMPRINTS OF TOURISM IN SPAIN

The last months of General Franco's life were marked by repression, a clear indicator that the dictatorship was losing popularity as the opposition was gaining momentum. It is true that the Spanish transition to democracy was a process full of uncertainties and critical moments, but *The New York Times* was quite confident on the prospects for a peaceful democratization process. A review of what was published about Spain during 1976 is useful not only to verify that statement but to find out a polyphonic narrative that perfectly depicts the economic and socio-cultural changes that took place in the country since the sixties. An account were the effects of tourism have great prominence.

Flora Lewis, excellent columnist and expert in international politics, moved to Marbella at the beginning of 1976 to personally collect the opinion of the wealthy inhabitants of this gentle tourist town. They conveyed calm to the journalist, reassuring that after the death of Franco things would more or less remain the same. However, as Lewis noted, some things had already changed. For example fast rising prices were harmful for the pockets of the foreign pensioners who visited the town, as they were losing purchasing power:

> The price of everything has gone up. It is still cheerful and hospitable and relaxing, but it is not cheap any more. "What has got to change", a talkative, helpful driver said, "is that the Government has to crack down on the gougers. They ought to have the heads of some of the hotelkeepers. Some of them jack up prices shamelessly. Of course the tourists find out they have been overcharged for their drinks or their car, and they tell each other afterward: 'Don't go to the Costa del Sol – you will be cheated'. It is natural". (Lewis, 1976, p. 2)

This kind of bad practices, which had become widespread as a result of the tourist boom, did not begin to be really annoying for foreign travelers until the outbreak of the oil crisis and the growing inflation that characterized both Late Francoism and the transition to democracy. The economic crisis dramatically hit coastal and seaside areas such as Marbella, which had abandoned other productive activities to focus almost exclusively on the services sector: "Tourism is the area's only industry. Ripe oranges burden the trees the way figs do in summer: they are being left to rot, for it costs too much to pick and ship them. Tourist fever, building fever and supermarket fever have turned most local minds away from agriculture" (Lewis, 1976, p. 2).

The massive construction of buildings on the Spanish seaside, most of them without respecting any architectural criteria, appears again in the newspaper. David M. Alpern, general editor of *Newsweek* magazine, described in his own words the features of one of the most popular tourist destination in Spain:

> The Costa Brava has a totally different atmosphere and style: slow-placed and unsophisticated on one and, marked by madcap overdevelopment on the other. The Costa Concrete. [...] Driving farther north, around the town of Llansá, we found the sprawl of concrete along the coast even more depressing- all that construction may well be a testimonial to Franco's striving for economic development, but counting condominiums is not our favorite pastime. (Alpern, 1976)

Along with the above-mentioned construction boom, infrastructures designed to improve communications also underwent a remarkable development during the period. A good example was the construction of the highway between the Costa Brava and the French border that, by mid-1976, was scheduled to reach Alicante. Benjamin Welles, former correspondent of *The New York Times* to Madrid, share his impressions with the readers after using that route:

> The *autopista* was first conceived in 1962 following a World Bank study. In 1965 a pilot project was begun near Barcelona, and in 1966 the Spanish Government authorized a system of toll roads to be built by Spanish consortiums, largely with American equipment, and financed both internationally and domestically. More than $1 billion has been raised to date. The consortiums have the toll rights for 23 years, after which the rights revert to the Government. The road, which has cost between $2 million and $50 million per mile so far, combines the best in United States engineering with the finest in Spanish scenery. (Welles, 1976, p. 27)

Beyond the capital invested, and its obvious positive effects for the local economy, Welles (1976) also accounted its human cost: "Some 23,000 acres of agricultural land have been taken in a region where every almond, olive or orange tree, every square meter of rich earth, has been planted, irrigated, terraced and passed down through families for generations".

Therefore, we can conclude that through the American sources we can have a better understanding of the impact that tourism had on Spain in the sixties and seventies and, at the same time, shed some light on several topics still needed to be addressed. One is the role played by U.S. capital in the development of the modern tourist industry during Franco's dictatorship. The other is the ability of the U.S. media to witness the end of an era. The quotes selected reveal that somehow those journalists were worried not only about the social costs of the tourist activity but because they mean the death of the primitive Spain. Thus, it may be very interesting to continue with this kind of analysis in order to reflect to what extend the view the American people had of Spain was real or just a construction. It seems that perceptions and misperceptions were equally important for the assessments of the socio-economic balance generated by the tourist boom in Spain.

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