“La Conciencia del Gran Miami”: Monsignor Bryan Walsh, Cold War Catholicism, and the Politics of Asylum in Multiethnic Miami

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Abstract

This article analyzes the relationship between the career of Irish immigrant priest Monsignor Bryan Walsh, Miami’s increasingly activist Catholic Church, and the diverse waves of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants that transformed Miami-Dade County between 1960 and the mid-1990s. In it, I explore the relationship between Monsignor Walsh’s highly visible efforts on behalf of Miami’s Cuban exile community and his less acknowledged advocacy for the city’s later Central American and Haitian asylum seekers. During the first half of the 1960s, Walsh’s perceived success as administrator of the Cuban Children’s Program established his enduring reputation as a committed “Cold Warrior” and loyal friend to U.S resident Cuban exiles; however, I argue that Monsignor Walsh’s support for the Cuban exile community, while harmonizing with his anti-communist politics, also reflected a deeper spiritual commitment that would lead him by the 1980s to advocacy on behalf of the other displaced Latin American and Caribbean peoples who began seeking refuge in Miami.


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in the 1970s. Adopting an inclusive stance on behalf of the “stranger and the poor” in Miami-Dade County, I conclude that Monsignor Walsh anticipated the Catholic Church’s new priorities following the Second Vatican Council, even as he offered an early challenge to the Cold War calculus underlying immigration policies that continue to draw arbitrary and self-serving distinctions between those who are welcomed as political exiles and those who are excluded as economic and ostensibly “voluntary” migrants.

Keywords: Miami, Cuban exiles, Cold War, Catholic Church, Cuban Children’s Program, U.S. Immigration Policy, Vatican II, Haitians, Central Americans, asylum.

Resumen
Este artículo plantea un estudio de la carrera de Monseñor Bryan Walsh, sacerdote inmigrante irlandés, en el contexto de una iglesia católica activista en Miami y con relación a varias olas de inmigrantes, procedentes de América Latina y el Caribe, que transformaron a Miami y al Condado de Dade entre 1960 y 1990. La autora investiga los nexos entre el manifiesto apoyo de Monseñor Walsh en favor de la comunidad cubana en el exilio y sus menos reconocidos esfuerzos en defensa de centroamericanos y haitianos que arribaron posteriormente en busca de asilo. El notable éxito de Monseñor Walsh en la primera mitad de la década de los sesenta como administrador del Cuban Children’s Program definió su reputación como amigo leal de los exiliados cubanos y firme soldado de la “Guerra Fría”. No obstante, la autora demuestra que el apoyo de Walsh a la comunidad cubana en el exilio, al mismo tiempo que concordaba con su ideología anti-comunista, reflejaba también un compromiso de carácter profundamente espiritual que lo llevaría a abogar por otros refugiados de América Latina y el Caribe que buscaban refugio en Miami en la década de los setenta. Al mantener Walsh esta actitud incluyente hacia “los pobres y los desconocidos” en Miami y el Condado de Dade, la autora concluye que el Monseñor anticipó las prioridades definidas por la iglesia católica en el Segundo Concilio del Vaticano, al tiempo que lanzaba una temprana crítica al razonamiento, típico de la Guerra Fría, que continúa manteniendo distinciones interesadas y arbitrarias entre algunos bienvenidos como exiliados políticos y aquellos definidos, y rechazados, por ser inmigrantes “voluntarios” de carácter económico.
This article analyzes the relationship between the career of Irish immigrant priest Monsignor Bryan Walsh, Miami’s increasingly activist Catholic Church, and the diverse waves of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants that transformed Miami-Dade County between 1960 and the mid-1990s. During the first half of the 1960s, Walsh’s perceived success as administrator of the Cuban Children’s Program established his enduring reputation as a committed “Cold Warrior” and loyal friend to U.S resident Cuban exiles; however, I argue that Monsignor Walsh’s support for the Cuban exile community, while harmonizing with his anti-communist politics, also reflected a deeper spiritual commitment that would lead him by the 1980s to advocacy on behalf of the other displaced Latin American and Caribbean peoples who began seeking refuge in Miami in the 1970s. Moreover, I argue that Walsh consciously deployed the powerful political capital invested in him as a result of his involvement in what would later be known as Operation Pedro Pan to critique U.S. immigration policies that admitted Cubans fleeing communist oppression while denying asylum to subsequent waves of Haitian and Central Americans seeking refuge from the violent repression of U.S. allied dictatorships in their homelands. In adopting this inclusive stance on behalf of the “stranger and the poor” in Miami-Dade County, I conclude that Monsignor Walsh anticipated the Catholic Church’s new priorities following the Second Vatican Council, even as he offered an early challenge to the Cold War calculus underlying immigration policies that continue to draw arbitrary and self-serving distinctions between those who are welcomed as political exiles and those who are excluded as economic and ostensibly “voluntary” migrants.

In 1955, the newly ordained Irish immigrant priest Father Bryan O. Walsh was appointed assistant director of Catholic Charities for the Diocese of St. Augustine, a tiny agency with twenty employees and a 100,000 dollar annual budget responsible for social service provisions to the entire state of Florida (“The Miami Herald Spirit of Excellence Awards”; O’Steen 1). In October 1958, he was named Diocesan Director of Catholic Charities in the newly organized Diocese of Miami. The relatively inexperienced young priest very quickly assumed a new role as one of Bishop Coleman F. Carroll’s leading advisors on community affairs (Walsh 1973). As Father Walsh became increasingly enmeshed in public welfare, inter-racial and inter-faith initiatives throughout Miami-Dade County, he simultaneously began to develop an awareness of the significance of Latin American immigration to the area. Determined to demonstrate his capacity for service to the growing local Latina/o community, the young priest persuaded Bishop Carroll to allow him to travel to Puerto Rico to study Spanish during the summer of 1960. Walsh’s studies at the Institute for Intercultural
Communication of the Catholic University of Puerto Rico were timely, were taking place at the same time that the growing radicalization of Castro’s Revolution provoked the first large scale exodus of middle class Catholic Cuban refugees into Miami. However, they would also serve as a consciousness raising experience that prepared him at a much deeper level for ministry to the Cuban refugee community as well as to later waves of displaced Latin American and Caribbean peoples that began to seek refuge in Miami during the 1980s.

When Father Walsh returned to Miami in August 1960, the influx of anti-Castro Cubans to the city had assumed alarming proportions, creating new strains on municipal infrastructure, filling local schools and hospitals, prompting community leaders to call for emergency federal support to shore up an already underfunded and overtaxed public welfare system (Walsh 1971: 386-387). In November of the same year, Walsh became aware of the even more urgent needs of a particularly vulnerable sector of the growing refugee population—a small number of Cuban children who were being sent unaccompanied to the U.S., where displaced relatives and friends already resident in Miami lacked necessary resources to care for them. He quickly made temporary arrangements through the Catholic Welfare Bureau to house and feed those children, but, aware that the number of unaccompanied children arriving in Miami was likely to increase as political turmoil and violence increased in Cuba, the young priest leveraged his relationship with the city’s Welfare Planning Council, of which he had been a member since 1957, in order to organize community and state welfare agencies to lobby the federal government for assistance.

Together, these agencies petitioned President Eisenhower for funding for a special foster care program for unaccompanied Cuban refugee children. Since at Walsh’s insistence children would be placed with co-religionist foster families, in order to safeguard their spiritual heritage—and since most Cubans were at least nominally Catholic—the main responsibility for the program would fall on the Catholic Charities-administered welfare agency (Walsh 1971: 388-389). As director of the Cuban Children’s Program, Father Walsh would arrange for the care of thousands of children spirited out of Cuba between 1960-1962 as part of a C.I.A. supported mission that later become known as Operation Pedro Pan.

The young priest was convinced of the Church’s urgent spiritual imperative to lead Miami’s response to the needs of displaced and destitute Cuban children (Walsh 1971: 390, 395). Walsh was also fully aware of the political implications of his fledgling program, and embraced the opportunity to play an active role in the ongoing global contest between democratic capitalism and communism. “No longer were we simply a
social agency concerned about a community problem,” the priest later recalled, revealing the extent to which his concern for the physical and spiritual wellbeing of dependent Cuban children in the fall of 1960 harmonized with his own anti-communist ideology. “We were now sharing the worries of families we did not even know, hundreds of miles away in a life and death struggle in the Cold War” (Walsh 1973: 395).

The Cuban Children’s Program would radically transform the visibility and capacity of Catholic Charities work in Miami-Dade County (Torres 148-149). Despite the misgivings of a handful of citizens harboring a lingering suspicion about the role of the Catholic Church in American society, the program enjoyed the overwhelming support of government, religious hierarchy and the public. As a result of the Miami diocese’s quick action to provide care to unaccompanied children, and more broadly, for its proactive handling of the Cuban refugee crisis, Bishop Carroll earned the appreciation of his local community and the admiration of the nation’s president, greatly strengthening the Church’s capacity for leadership in municipal affairs. The institutional Church thus gained power, prestige and visibility as a result of Father Walsh’s initiative in founding the Cuban Children’s Program.

The young Irish priest also benefited personally from the widespread —albeit overly simplistic— public perception that the program had been an unqualified success (Torres 167-177). Thrust into the local and nationwide media spotlight, Walsh thus found himself suddenly endowed with a powerful new reservoir of moral and political capital. In 1962, the same year that Pope John XXIII called the Second Vatican Council into session, the Holy Father named Walsh Papal Chaplain with the title of Monsignor in recognition of his work with Cuban refugee children. The papal commendation reflected well on the entire diocese; from that point on, Walsh later recalled, Bishop Carroll would demonstrate a consistent willingness to get involved in “any and every social issue that came along” (Walsh 1973). This new activist commitment emerged at precisely the moment when Vatican II began to inspire the Catholic hierarchy towards greater attention to questions of social justice, cultural diversity and the needs of poor and immigrant Catholics (O’Malley).

Reflecting the broadening scope of his advocacy as well as the explosive growth of Miami-Dade County’s Catholic population, in 1969 —the year after the diocese of Miami was reorganized as an archdiocese and Bishop Carroll was named archbishop— Monsignor Walsh was given the title of Episcopal Vicar for Spanish Speaking Peoples and Migrant Workers. The year before Walsh’s new appointment, the Latin American Bishops conference in Medellín had called for the Church to actively apply the Second Vatican Council’s mandate for increased outreach and advocacy among the poor of
Latin American and, by extension, among Latinos in the United States (Badillo 89). As the new archdiocese of Miami began to apply these new directives in the early 1970s, Monsignor Walsh began to turn his attention away from the exile community in order to respond to the more pressing needs of a new wave of impoverished Latin American and Caribbean migrants arriving in Miami.

Reflecting his shifting priorities at the beginning of the decade, in a 1973 essay Walsh wrote pointedly that “the Latin American experience in Miami is not all Cuban refugees” (Walsh 1973). Indeed, the local Church’s newfound concern with immigrants would soon expand beyond the Spanish speaking nations of the Americas, when the first boatload of sixty five Haitians landed in Miami on December 12, 1972. Fleeing both political oppression and widespread economic deprivation, the first Haitian refugees were received with hostility by the Miami community. In stark contrast with the two previous waves of anti-Castro Cubans, who had been legally paroled into the country and provided with generous financial resettlement assistance, by 1973, the approximately 550 Haitians in Miami-Dade County remained in legal limbo, with the majority released into the community without any means of support to await asylum hearings. Ninety-two Haitian men were detained in local jails. Initially, the only support for the destitute Haitians came from Miami’s African American community, most notably from Black protestant churches. However, Monsignor Walsh quickly began to lobby Bishop Carroll to take action on behalf of the mostly Catholic Haitians.

Upon Walsh’s suggestion, Archbishop Carroll assigned interim responsibility for coordinating services to Haitian refugees at the Centro Hispano and appointed Charles Jackson, Florida’s first African American priest who had learned the French liturgy during missionary service in Martinique, to minister to the new Haitian arrivals. Jackson offered the archdiocese’s first Haitian Mass in December 1973, at the Church of Corpus Christi in Miami’s Allapattah neighborhood (Rey and Stepick, qtd. in, Stepick, Rey and Mahler 2009: 1974). In the meantime, Monsignor Walsh continued to work with African American religious leaders pursuing the release of the almost one hundred Haitian men detained in Miami jails. In July 1974, after local Black churches raised funds to pay their bond, the archdiocese of Miami offered to provide temporary housing and meals for the destitute men at St. John Vianney Seminary. While criticizing the apparent indifference of local white religious leaders to the plight of Haitian refugees, The African American *Miami Times* nonetheless acknowledged Archbishop Carroll’s offer of assistance, “though late in coming,” as a “welcome gesture in the Black community”:
At long last, someone other than the Black Baptist churches has finally beaten the cobwebs off of their sense of humanitarianism and offered a drastically needed hand of assistance to South Florida’s poverty stricken Haitian refugees. (*The Miami Times* 24 July 1974)

Having prompted Archbishop Carroll to play a more active role in responding to the needs of displaced Haitians, Monsignor Walsh also began to pressure local congressmen Pepper, Fascell and Lehman for a long term solution to the refugee crisis, which he felt should include access to the same kind of visas that had been provided to earlier waves of Cubans (Walsh 1974). However, several years passed without federal legislative action, and Miami’s growing Haitian community languished in legal limbo and struggled to survive in an increasingly hostile city. Under Walsh’s leadership, Catholic Charities struggled to meet the needs of the more than 10,000 Haitians who arrived in Miami by the end of the decade, without the kind of federal assistance that had been provided for the support of Cuban refugees in the early 1960s (Masud-Piloto 115).

In 1980, the stark contrast between the reception afforded to those fleeing oppression in Cuba and Haiti became impossible to ignore. During that year’s Mariel Boatlift, 125,000 Cubans were received and processed for admission to the United States. At the same time, approximately 25,000 Haitians entered, were denied asylum and threatened with deportation. Then, in 1981, the new Reagan administration abandoned the previous policy of releasing asylum applicants into the community and instead, as part of a plan to curb the Haitian exodus, began to incarcerate new arrivals in Camp Krome, a former missile base in North Dade County. In September of the same year, President Reagan issued an executive order authorizing the Coast Guard to intercept refugee vessels at sea and to return would-be asylees to Haiti — even though their repatriation meant probable death or imprisonment (*Newsweek* 2 June 1980: 53).

The detention and interception of Haitians at sea provoked an outcry against an increasingly inhuman and discriminatory immigration policy. Together with Miami’s leading religious leaders, including Archbishop Edward McCarthy, Cuban exile Bishop Augustín Román, Father Thomas Wenski, and Haitian immigrant priest Father Gerard Darbouze, Monsignor Walsh drafted a letter to President Reagan demanding the immediate release of Haitians detained in Camp Krome (Walsh 1981). In an article entitled “Let’s Welcome the Refugees,” also published in 1981, Walsh further challenged the racist and xenophobic underpinnings of the U.S. immigration policy, drawing an explicit connection between earlier generations’ nativist fears of “hordes of wild Irishmen” and anti-Haitian sentiment in Miami and across the nation (Walsh 1981).
On June 18, 1982, Judge Eugene Spellman of the 11th District Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the Reagan administration’s immigration policy illegal and ordered the almost 1,800 Haitians detained at Krome and elsewhere released (Stepick 1982: 14-17). However, the Spellman decision was reversed in 1984, and the 11th District Court of Appeals’ new ruling stated that illegal entrants enjoyed no constitutional protections and could thus be detained indefinitely (The Miami Herald 1 July 1984: 16a). Compounding the anguish visited upon the Haitian community by this decision, in November 1984, the INS granted legal status to the 125,000 Cubans who had arrived during the Mariel Boatlift, making them eligible under the terms of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act for an expedited path to citizenship (The Miami Herald 20 November 1984: 1a).

During the height of the struggle for justice for Haitian detainees, Miami’s Catholic Church would also confront a second immigration crisis. After the 1979 revolution that deposed the Somoza dictatorship and installed the leftist Sandinistas in power, Nicaraguans began fleeing their war-torn nation for the United States. Over the next five years, they were joined by several hundred thousand Salvadorans and Guatemalans escaping violent right wing dictatorships in their homelands (Masud-Piloto 120). The estimated 70,000 anti-communist Nicaraguans who sought refuge in Miami, including more than 7,000 Nicaraguan minors fleeing imminent conscription into the Sandinista army, were confident they would receive the same welcome that had been offered to successive waves of Cuban exiles (The Miami Herald 15 September 1984: 26a). Instead, less than ten percent of their asylum petitions were successful. Moreover, the majority of their requests for temporary work permits, pending the resolution of their cases, were also denied. The INS’s hard line toward these would-be asylum-seekers forced the majority of Miami’s Nicaraguans into the shadows, struggling to survive as low wage undocumented workers and living in fear of imminent deportation. Several hundred unsuccessful applicants were, in fact, deported during the early 1980s, even as the INS continued to approve at much higher rates the asylum petitions of Iranians, Eastern Europeans and Ethiopians (Walsh 1987).

American religious leaders were among the first to advocate on behalf of the growing numbers of undocumented Nicaraguans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans whose failed asylum petitions left them in legal limbo. In 1982, Arizona Protestants launched the Sanctuary Movement, which quickly grew to encompass a network of 250 churches, synagogues and Quaker meeting houses working together to provide shelter and legal assistance to Central Americans fleeing repression and violence in their homelands (García). Monsignor Walsh, who had arranged housing for a number
of unaccompanied Central American children in Catholic Charities homes, went on record in support of the Sanctuary Movement and those it sought to help. Speaking to a *New York Times* reporter, the Irish immigrant priest pointed out that undocumented Central Americans who had entered sanctuary “are not hiding or running away, and yet most of them could be arrested and sent to their countries at any time, facing imprisonment or worse.”

Like most Sanctuary activists, he laid the blame for the problem of undocumented Central American immigration squarely at the feet of the U.S. government, asserting that: “the Reagan administration has chosen to take the most rigid and narrow view in applying the 1980 [Refugee] Act [...] it is extremely difficult for an ordinary person to prove he or she is in danger.” In a confident expression of his evolving post-Vatican II worldview, one that admitted no separation between the spiritual and political in the struggle for social justice, Monsignor Walsh asserted the right of the Church to defy the nation’s unethical immigration laws. “By promoting the idea of sanctuary, we are not seeking confrontation with the government,” he insisted. “We are trying to provide a respite, an opportunity for the authorities and the courts to reconcile the interpretation of law with the values of society” (*The New York Times* 8 April 1983).

As the Irish priest’s frustration with the U.S. government’s apparent indifference to the fate of undocumented Central Americans mounted, Walsh found himself increasingly caught between his longstanding commitment to the Cuban exile community and his growing concern for other Latin American and Caribbean refugees —especially in light of the passage that same year of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which excluded most undocumented Central Americans in the U.S. from its amnesty provision. Following IRCA’s promulgation, the Miami Archdiocese and the local Nicaraguan community joined forces to lobby the Reagan administration to provide relief for the tens of thousands who had been denied a path to legalization. They achieved a measure of success in July 1987, when Attorney General Edwin Meese announced that undocumented Nicaraguans who had a well-founded fear of persecution would no longer be subject to deportation and would be eligible for work permits (Soltero 135-144). Monsignor Walsh expressed terse approval for the new policy; however, he noted that the denial of asylum to other Central American refugees, especially Salvadorans and Guatemalans, continued. He called on Miami voters to support congressional efforts to extend the protection of the law to other undocumented Central Americans by offering stays of deportation or extended voluntary departure status (Walsh 1987).
However, by the end of the 1980s and despite Monsignor Walsh’s repeated public condemnations of the nation’s discriminatory immigration policy, the city’s increasingly politically powerful Cuban American community remained reluctant to support demands for legal relief and resettlement assistance for Miami’s other Central American and Caribbean displaced peoples. As the pews of Little Havana’s San Juan Bosco Church increasingly filled with Nicaraguans, the parish’s Cuban exile congregation welcomed and offered spiritual and material assistance to their anti-communist co-religionists—but, like the majority of the city’s exile leaders, stopped short of acknowledging the vast gap between their own privileged context of reception in the 1960s and 70s and the legal and socioeconomic disadvantages that confronted Nicaraguans fleeing the leftist regime in their homeland (Stepick, Rey and Mahler 141-145). They were similarly silent on the fates of other undocumented Central Americans, including Salvadorans and Guatemalans, as well as on the continuing arrival of thousands of Haitian boat people to south Florida every year.

In August 1990, an increasingly impatient Monsignor Walsh publicly challenged the exile community to assume their moral obligation to advocate for the city’s other immigrants. In a Miami Herald op-ed entitled “Let the Cuban Community Aid its Haitian Brothers,” he pointed out that “of the more than 21,000 Haitians detained on the high seas since 1981, the United States has deemed only six to have credible claims worthy of a hearing.” He denounced the blatant discriminatory policy of the nation’s last five Presidents, all of whom had refused to use executive action to grant extended voluntary departure status to Haitians, at the same time that they “readily granted” similar status to “their next door neighbors, the Cubans”:

For eighteen years, the Haitians have watched this country and this community welcome with open arms every Cuban who makes it to our shore. Haitians do not feel animosity toward Cubans, but they must feel some jealousy for those who routinely receive more favorable treatment. I am a longtime advocate for Cuban refugees. Now, I feel that the time has come for the leaders of the Cuban community to take up the cause of their Haitian brothers and sisters. Cubans must begin to use their real influence in Washington to bring about a reversal of these discriminatory policies.

Directly linking Cubans’ earlier experience as political refugees to the contemporary plight of Miami’s growing Haitian community, Monsignor Walsh concluded that a demonstration of support for Haitian asylum seekers would be “the best way for the Cuban community to say ‘Thanks’” for the welcome they had received thirty years earlier (Walsh 1990).
Beginning in the early 1970s, Miami’s conservative Cuban exile community grew increasingly uncomfortable with the “communist-like” social justice teachings of Miami’s increasingly activist Catholic Church (Badillo 84; Poyo and Matovina 222). However, despite his own progressive spiritual worldview and commitment to causes exiles looked upon with deep suspicion—including his civil rights activism, his support for the state’s Latin American and Caribbean migrant agricultural workers, and especially his critique of the Reagan administration and the racist underpinnings of the differential treatment afforded Haitian and Central American asylum seekers—Walsh continued to be viewed as an “ardent friend” of the Cuban American community (Badillo 85–86).

On March 20, 1999, at ceremony attended by more than 400 people, Miami-Dade County’s Cuban American Mayor Alex Penelas presented Monsignor Walsh with UNICEF’s annual “For the Love of Children” award. In a letter to El Nuevo Herald, Luis Cepero Aday, a former political prisoner of the Castro regime, expressed the enduring love of even the most conservative members of the exile community for the activist Irish immigrant priest:

I am not Catholic, rather Protestant […] Nonetheless, when I am before Catholic men of the human, moral and religious stature of Monsignor Bryan O. Walsh, I feel an immense respect and admiration. I rejoice infinitely that an institution like UNICEF should recognize the value of this great man, who will live forever in the heart of Cubans for saving thousands of children, who are now successful and prosperous men and women in the United States and other parts of the world, from the cruel communism that still enslaves my homeland. I give thanks to God for permitting me the honor of living in the land of a man such as this. (El Nuevo Herald March 1999)

The editorial board of El Nuevo Herald concurred, calling the priest a “guardian angel for Cuban children and adolescents;” but they also drew attention to the role that Monsignor Walsh had played in shepherding Miami-Dade County through an arduous forty year long demographic and racial transformation, as a result of which a provincial and largely white southern city had become, by the eve of the new millennium, a multiethnic global metropolis, noting that the priest had “also been the guardian angel of Haitian and Central American refugees” and “one of the best friends to the poor and defenseless of all nationalities in south Florida” (El Nuevo Herald 25 March 1999).

Beginning in 1960 and until his death in 2000, Monsignor Bryan O. Walsh’s determination to leverage the Catholic Church’s prestige, expertise and resources in order to proactively meet the needs of the growing Cuban exile community, and especially the thousands of Pedro Pan children towards whom he maintained a lifelong
fatherly concern, endowed the Irish immigrant priest with powerful political capital that he would leverage during his forty year ministry to the increasingly populous and diverse city. Subordinating his professed anti-communism to his more fundamental spiritual commitment to “the stranger and the poor”, Walsh offered an early and persistent critique of the Cold War calculus of his adopted nation’s self-interested immigration policies, condemning the U.S. government’s practice of admitting Cubans fleeing communist oppression while denying asylum to subsequent waves of Haitian and Central Americans seeking refuge from violent right wing dictatorships in their homelands. In the years before and after Vatican II, Monsignor Walsh thus played a crucial role in transforming Miami’s Catholic Church into a consistent advocate, not only for Cuban exiles, but also for the subsequent waves of displaced Latin American and Caribbean peoples who propelled Miami’s transformation into a multi-ethnic global city.

REFERENCES


